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RÉSUMÉ 
La présente thèse porte sur l'étude de plusieurs suj ets en macroéconomie monétaire 
et financière. En effet , notre analyse va e pencher sur des questions qui res tent sans 
réponse dans la littérature et parfo is pousser l 'analyse plus loin que ce qui est déjà fai t. 
Cette thèse se compose de trois essais. 
Le premier chapitre, qui s'intitule «Equity Premium In a Small Open Economy», 
étudie le comportement de la prime d 'équité dans une petite économie ouverte. Les 
modèles du cycle réel (RBC) bien qu'ils arrivent à expliquer la d ynamique du cycle éco-
nomique et à reproduire les caractéristiques des variables macroéconomiques, échouent 
toutefois à reproduire les faits stylisés concernant les prix des actifs. La modification de 
la fonction d 'ut ilité p our tenir compte des habitudes de consommation des agents ainsi 
que l'incorporation de coüt d 'ajustement du capital arrivent à résoudre ce problème 
dans un cadre d 'analyse d 'économie fermé. Nos résulta ts montrent que ce type de mo-
dèle génère une faible prime de risque une fois que le cadre d 'analyse d 'économie ouverte 
est utilisé, et ce, comparativement à la prime observée dans les données historiques. Cet 
échec peut être attribuable au fait que les ménages domestiques p euvent jouer sur le 
lissage de leur consommation avec l'accès aux marchés financiers internationaux. 
Le deuxième chapi tre, qui s 'int itule « Monetary Policy, Financial Crisis and Effects 
on Real Economy », étudie le comportement des chocs monétaires combinés à des pertur-
bations financièr s et leurs effets sur l'économie, et surtout , le volet réel de celle-ci. On 
examine alors l'exogèneité des chocs de politique monétaire et des crises sur le marché 
boursier pour analyser par la suite l'impact des deux perturbations et leurs implications 
sur les variables macroéconomiques . Nos résultats montrent , selon toute évidence em-
pirique, que les deux types de chocs sont exogènes pour démontrer par la suite que ces 
p erturbations ont des effets significatifs sur l'activité économique réelle. 
Pour conclure, on s 'est penché clans le dernier chapitre intitulé « Hybrid Infiation-
Price-Level Targeting in Small-Open-Economy New-Keynesian Pramework » , sur les 
règles de condui te de polit ique monétaire en petite économie ouver te. C 'est ainsi qu 'on 
s 'est arrêté dans cette étude sur les conséquences de diverses règles de condui te de la 
politique monétaire, en se préoccupant plus de la règle hybride qui vise la stabilité des 
prix en ciblant en même temps un niveau général des prix combiné à un taux d 'inflation 
prédéterminé. Nos résultats montrent que le modèle hybride peut donner une bonne 
alternative aux régimes ciblant uniquement le t aux d 'inflation ou le niveau des prix, 
sans une perte majeur au niveau du bien-être économique. 
Mots Clés : Prime cl 'Équité, Formation d 'Habitucle, Chocs Monétaires, Poli tiques 
Monétaires, petite économie ouverte , Modèle d 'Équilibre General. 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis consists of three essays on varions monetary and financial topics and sheds 
new light on some questions t hat are still ambiguous or have not yet been explored in 
the literature. 
Chapter I focuses on the behavior of asset prices in relation to consumption and other 
business cycle variables. While RBC models have been able to successfully explain the 
dynamics of macroeconomic variables, they fail to replicate similar interesting stylized 
facts when studying t he behavior of asset prices. In an attempt to solve this shortcoming, 
some progress has been made in models that modify utili ty in order to account for habit 
persistence and incorporate capital adjustment costs. We have developed a framework 
that combines these ingredients by applying the loglinearly reduced form of t he general 
equilibrium model and the asset pricing formula, based on the lognormality of the 
dist urbance distribut ion for the small open economy case. Our findings indicate t hat in 
a small open economy environment this kind of model fails to account for a substantial 
equity premium. 
In Chapter II , we focus on postwar US data and incorporate new financia l measures 
and monetary policy shocks in a vector autoregression (VAR) system in order to test 
whether one or the other has any real effect on the economy. We find econometric 
evidence that these shocks and events are exogenous, and therefore the exogenous nature 
of shocks to monetary policy and stock market crashes investigated in this s tudy may 
help policymakers , esp ecially regarding debates related to eventual relationships between 
optimal monetary policy and fi nancial stability. 
Finally in Chapter III , we use a small open economy version of the Calvo sticky price 
model to investigate hybrid inflation/price-level targeting. We explore the proprieties of 
this kind of targeting regime within a calibrated structural general equilibrium model. 
We also consider monetary policy in terms of Taylor interest rate rules and conduct 
a welfare analysis on varions specifications. Our analyses show that hybrid targeting 
performs well and produces quantitatively good restùts, compared to those regimes that 
target only price levels or inflation rates. A hybrid regime thus appears to provide a 
successful method for conducting monetary policy in a small open economy. 
Keywords : Equity Premium, Habi t Formation, Monetary shocks, Monetary Policy, 
Small Open Economy, General Equilibrium Model. 
INTRODUCTION GÉNÉRALE 
Les modèles d 'équilibre général dynamiques se sont avéré appropriés et utiles pour 
l'étude des interactions économiques ent re les marché et les agents dans un cadre d 'ana-
lyse macroéconomique de plus en plus complexe. En effet , les travaux de Kydland et 
Prescott (1982) et de Long et Plosser (1983) ont ervi à la construction de plusieurs 
modèle ayant pour obj ectif de base l'analyse du cycle économique.1 Toutefois, l'in-
capacité des modèles RBC à reproduire certaines caract éri stiques essent ielles du cycle 
économique a suscité l'avènement de modèle qui intègrent des frictions tant au niveau 
du marché du travail que du marché des biens et services. 
Ainsi, on a assisté durant les deux dernières décennie à l'avènement d 'une panoplie 
de méthodologies qui ont essayé de remédier aux imperfection de ce type de modèle. 
Dans ce sen , on a essayé de résoudre l'un des échecs des modèles RBC et peut être le plu 
important qui demeure celui de la modélisation des prix des actif . Bien que de essai · 
aient été menés pour résoudre cette imperfec tion , la modélisation du fonctionnement du 
marché financier a été ignorée ou tout simplement mise de coté par les modèles RBC 
qui n 'arrivent pas à donner des explications satisfaisantes aux faits stylisés concernant 
les rendements des actifs financiers. 
En out re, les modèles d 'équilibre général dynamique sont aussi u tilisés dans l'étude 
des poli t iques monétaire . Ces étude· visent plus par ticulièrement à cerner leurs impli-
cations sur le reste de l'économie et ainsi produire de bonnes prédictions quant à la 
poli tique optimale à suivre par les autorités monétaires. Pour ce faire, plusieurs auteurs 
prônent des considérations empiriques et théoriques instructives des forces et des fai-
blesses de ce type de modèle pour construire leur résultats. Ce qui a permi d 'enrichir 
la littérature par des contribut ions méthodologiques qui parfois arrivent à résoudre cer-
1 Les modèles d u cycle réel (RBC) sont les plus étudiés dans ce genre de li ttérature. 
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taines énigmes du passé (Calvo, 1983 , Yun, 1996 et Clarida et a l. 1999 pour ne citer que 
quelque uns). 
Cette thèse, laquelle est con ti tuée de trois e a is, se situe dans ce cadre d 'analyse. 
En effet , not re analyse va se pencher sur des quest ions qui restent sans répon e dans la 
li ttérature et parfois pousser l'analyse plus loin que ce qui es t déjà fait. On a donc utilisé 
un cadre d 'analyse d 'équilibre général pour explorer , dans un premier essai, les modèles 
trai tant les prix des actifs dan un environnement de pet ite économie ouverte , pour 
ensui te étudier, dans un second e sai, le comportement des chocs monétaires combinés 
à des perturbations financières sur l'économie et surtout sur le volet réel de l'activité 
économique. 
On se penche, dans un troisième essai, sur les règles de conduite de poli tique monétaire 
en petite économie ouverte. C 'es t ainsi qu 'on s'e t arrêté dans cette étude sur les 
conséquences de d iverses règles de condui te de la polit ique monétaire, en se préoccupant 
plus de la règle hybride qui vise la tabi lité de prix en ciblant en même temp un ni-
veau général des prix combiné à un taux d 'inflation prédéterminé. On analyse alors 
plusieurs questions que pose la condui te de la poli tique monétaire dans un tel cadre. 
P lus préci ément , on examine diverses règles en comparai on avec la règle hybride que 
peuvent suivre des autorités monétaires déterminées à assurer la stabili té des prix. 
Ainsi, dans le premier essai, on s'intéresse à la modélisation du comportement des 
rendements des actifs financiers. Cette question a suscité beaucoup d 'intérêt au cour des 
dernières années. Le modèle de dotation de Lucas (197 ) a donné suite à un littérature 
abondante trait ant les relations entre fluctuations économiques et rendements des actif , 
ce qui a aboutit à plusieurs controver es . 
La que tion principale de tou tes ces études es t de concilier les données et la théorie 
économique et donc de construire des modèles avec processu endogènes pouvant générer 
ce qu 'on observe au niveau de ces donnée . En effet , les donnée (tirées des ba e de 
données des pays industrialisés pour la période d 'après-guerre) montrent par exemple 
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que la consommation est lisse et , par conséquence, que la covariance entre les rendements 
des actifs et la consommation est faible. Or, dans les modèles des prix des actifs basés 
sur la consommation introduits par Han n et Singleton (1983) , la quantité du risque du 
marché financier est mesurée par la covariance entre le rendement excédentaire de actifs 
financiers et le taux de croissance de la consommation, tandis que le prix du risque est 
mesuré par le degré d 'aversion pour le ri que de l' inve t i ur. Le rendement moyen élevé 
des actifs risqués et le bas taux d 'intérêt sur les actifs sans risque (faits stylisés) implique 
donc que le rendement excédentaire espéré sur les actifs risqué (la prime d 'équité) est 
élevé. La consommat ion étant lisse , la prime d 'équité peut être expliquée seulement si 
on suppose un coefficient d 'aversion pour le risque de !'investi eur exce ivement élevé, 
d 'où l'énigme. 
P lusieurs étude ont essayé de résoudre cette énigme en introduisant une classe 
de fonctions d'utilité avec formation d 'habitude (Abel, 1990 et Constantinides , 1990). 
Le succès relatif de ce type de fonction d 'utilité réside dans le fait qu 'elle génère une 
variabi li té excessive de l'utilité marginale de la con ommation, d 'où une covariance 
élevée entre cette utilité marginale et le rendement excédentaire de actifs r isqués . En 
conséquence, la prime d 'équité est expliquée sans recours à un coeffi cient d 'aversion 
élevé. 
Cependant, Rouwenhorst (1995) conclut que dans le cadre d 'une économie fermée 
expliquer une prime de risque sub tantielle e t difficile à cause du li sage de la consom-
mation par les agents quand le degré d 'aversion pour le ri que augmente. Les agents 
économiques dans ce cas peuvent facilement changer leurs plans de production et faire 
face aux fluctua tions de leurs consommations (Jermann , 1994) ; cela implique que c'est 
l' ajustement du stock du capital qui est à la source de cette faib les e dans ce genre 
de modèle. L 'introduction de coûts d 'ajustement du capital peut toutefois résoudre ce 
problème et , avec une bonne spécification de la fon ction d 'uti li té, on peut arriver à 
capter la prime d 'équité et même à ré oudre son énigme (Jermann, 1998) . 
Les résultats obtenus dans notre étude montrent que le modèle avec un s cteur de 
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production et une fonction d'utili té caractéri ée par une formation d 'habi tude et un coût 
d 'ajustement pour le capital ne peut pas expliquer la prime d 'équité dans une petite 
économie ouverte. En effet le modèle génère une faible prime comparée à celle ob ervée 
dans les données historiques . Cet échec peut être a ttribuable au fait que le ménages 
dame tiques peuvent jouer sur le li sage de leur consommation, avec l'accès aux marchés 
finan ciers internationaux. Dan ce cas-ci, l'ajout subst antiel apporté au modèle RBC 
standard par la formation d 'habitude et les coûts d 'ajustement du capital sera contré 
par I ouverture de l'économie sur les marchés fin anciers internationaux. D'où le fait 
que le succès relatif obtenu par J ermann (1998) , Benninga et Protopapadakis (1990) , 
Danthine et al. (1992) et Rouwenhorst (1995) ne soit possible qu 'en économie fermée. 
Le modèle arrive toutefois à bien expliquer les stati t ique du cycle économique et à 
reproduire des résultats similaires à ceux obtenus à partir des données canadiennes. 
Dans ce sens, nou étudions le cas d 'une peti te économie ouverte , pour capter la 
prime cl 'équité t voir si les résulta ts obtenus par le étude précéclentes2 tiennent une 
fois que l'on instaure un marché d 'échange international dan le modèle. En effet , l'in-
troduction d 'un marché d 'échange avec l'étranger dans ce genre de modèle donne un 
nouveau canal au lissage de la con ommation par les agent , on doi t alors s'attendre à 
ce que la prime de ri que bai e vu que la covariance ent re le rendement de l'ac tif risqué 
et l'utili té marginale de la con ommation diminue. 
Ainsi, nous utilisons la méthode de lin , arisation (King et al. , 1988) en combinaison 
avec une formulation non linéaire des prix des actifs (Campbell , 19 6 et 1996), ce qui 
va permettre à la fois de capter la différenc entre les r ndement ex-ante des ti tres 
financiers et par conséquent d 'étudier le comportement de la prime de risque dans ce 
modèle. 
En second plan , nous appliquons une formulation de prix lognormal suivant la 
méthode de Han en et Singleton (1983), étudiée dans J ermann (1998) . Cette technique 
permet de capter la prim de ri que dans le cadre d 'une économie ouverte, d 'étudier les 
2 Voir Jerm ann , 1998, B nninga et Protopapadakis, 1990, Danthine et a l. , 1992, et Rouwenhorst, 
1995, entre autres. 
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prédictions des modèles avec économie de production dan ce cadre et de se pencher sur 
le comportement de la con ommation et des prix des acti5 un foi s qu 'on introduit la 
po · ibilité d 'avoir de créances sur l'étranger. 
Dan un second essai, on s'intéresse à une autre dimension du problème de fl uctua-
tions macroéconomiques, à savoir l'effet des chocs financiers et monétair · sur l'activité 
économique réelle. À cet effet, nous examinon en profond eur l'impact des chocs de 
poli t ique monétaire et des crises sur le marché bour ier sur le volet réel de l'économie. 
ous étudions d 'abord l'exogèneité des cieux perturbations, et analy ans par la sui te 
leurs implications ur le va riables macroéconomiques . 
Malgré le fait que les chocs aux poli tiques monétaires soient bien documentés dan 
la li ttérature [Ramer et Romer (1989, 1994 et 2004), Leeper (1997), Christiano, Eichen-
baum et Evans (1996), Barth et Ramey (2001) et Boivin (2001)], rien n 'est encore fait 
pour la nouvelle me ure de Romer et Romer (2004), ni pour les crises survenues sur 
le marché boursier . Ainsi nou essayons de vérifier leur exogèneité et leur impact sur 
l'économie. 
otre objectif est d 'étudier les effets des chocs monétaires et financiers sur diverses 
variable macroéconomiques. L'exactitude de cette évalua tion dépend es nt iellement 
des mesures de chocs utilisées . Ainsi, nous employons la nouvelle mesure des chocs de 
politique monétaire aux États-Unis développée récemment par Romer et Romer (2004), 
et les dates de chocs boursiers établies par Mishkin et White (2002), vu qu 'elles donnent 
une bonne approximation des chocs qu 'on veut étudier. 
En outre, nous utilisons la procédure économétrique employée pour la première 
foi s par Leeper (1997) pour étudier l'exogenéité des variable binaires de Ramer et 
Ramer (1989, 1994). Cette méthodologie combine l'approche narrative avec un vecteur 
autorégressif (VAR) afin de vérifier si ces chocs contiennent une composan te endogène. 
Comme il a été ment ionné ci-de sus, notre mesure de choc monétaire, développée 
récemment par Ramer et Ramer (2004) , est basée sur leurs lec tures des rapports des 
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rencontres de la commission fédérale des marchés financiers (FOMC) , combinées av c 
l'information sur le t aux de rendement de la réserve fédérale. Romer et Romer (2004) 
incorporent leur mesure de chocs à la politique monétaire dan un VAR suivant les tra-
vaux de Christiano, Eichenbaum et Evans (1996). Ils trouv nt que le chocs de politique 
monétaire identifiés ont des effets statistiquement significatifs et qu 'un choc négatif 
de politique monétaire produi t une réponse forte de l'output et une réponse forte et 
négative du niveau des prix. 
En ce qui concerne les cri e financières, nou employons les dates identifiée par 
Mi hkin et White (2002). Les auteurs appliquent une approche narrative dans le sens 
des travaux de Hamilton (1983) et de Romer et Romer (1989, 1994) pour iden tifier les 
date où le marché boursier s'est effondré aux État -Unis au cour du siècle dernier. 
Basé sur leur analyse historique de toute les crises sur le marché financier au 
vingtième siècle aux États-Unis, Mishkin et White (2002) identifient l cri e majeures 
ayant frappé le secteur financier. Leur définition du crash bour ier uppo e une forte 
perte soudaine de valeur des actions des sociétés cotées en bourse. En effet , en utilisant 
les indice bour ier (Dow Jones, S & P 500 et le ASDAQ) , la taille de l'effondrement , 
la dur ' e de la cri e comme moyen d 'identification et les crash uni ver ellement reconnu 
d 'octobre 1929 et 1987 comme repère·, il ident ifient 15 crises financières principales 
pendant le dernier siècle. Ainsi, à partir de ces date , nou construison une variable 
binair qui prend la valeur un aux dates identifiées par Mi hkin et White, et zéro ailleurs . 
Nos résultats montrent , selon toute évidence empirique, que les cieux types de chocs 
(cri e financière et choc au politique monétaire) sont exogènes. Ce résultats restent 
valide même lorsque nous incluon d'autres chocs exogène dans le VAR ou quand 
différents poids sont attribués aux dates de crise financière. On démontre aussi que ces 
perturbations ont des effets significatifs ur l'activi té économique réelle. 
Le troisième essai traite en profondeur la réaction de la banque c ntrale face à de · 
fluctuation au niveau de l'inflation et du niveau des prix. On s' intéresse en particulier à 
la cible d'inflation et au niveau de prix dans un modèle hybride de type 'néo-Keyné ien' 
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comme objectif de la banque centrale dan · le cas d 'une petite économie ouverte. 
La cible d 'inf-ia tion a été largement adoptée dans la conduite de politique monétaire 
visant à stabiliser les prix tout au long de la dernière décennie. En effet , plusieur pay 
industrialisés, dont le Canada, ont adopté des règles ciblant un taux préétabli d 'inflation 
et jusqu 'ici, la plupart d 'entre eux semblent enregistrer de bonnes performances tant en 
matière d 'inf-iation que de croissance économique. 
En revanche, plusieurs auteurs d ' montrent que la cible de niveau de prix induit une 
inflation à court terme plus élevée et une grande variabili té de l'output que celles en-
registrées avec la cible du taux d 'inflation (CI) (voir Fischer, 1994, Haldane et Salmon , 
1995). Cependant , Dittmar et al. (1999) et Svensson (1999) avancent des arguments en 
faveur de la cible du niveau des prix (CP) suggérant que la variabilité cl 'infla tion de-
vienne inférieure avec la CP, si on suppose qu 'on a une persistance modérée de l 'outpu t . 
Dans la pratique, le eu! pays à avoir adopté la CP était la Suède clan les années 30 
(voir Berg et le Jonung, 1999). 
otre but ici es t d 'approfondir la recherche sur le modèle hybride en suppo ant la 
présence dans l 'économie d 'une banque centrale ciblant en même temp, le taux d 'in-
flation et le niveau des prix . Le cadre d 'analyse adopté est celui d' une petite économie 
ouverte avec un modèle néo-Keynésien . L'avantage d 'un tel environnement ré ide dans le 
comportement 'forwarcl-looking' des agent représentatifs, ce qui condui t par exemple 
à la stabilisation du problème de biais, une foi s que l'autorité monét a ire adopte une 
politique monétaire discrétionnaire (Clarida et al. , 1999). 
Dans ce travail , nou proposons d 'étudier le comportement du régime hybride tout 
en le différenciant de cieux autres types de polit ique monétaire, à avoir un régime 
ciblant uniquement le taux d 'inflation et un autre ciblant plu tôt le niveau des prix. 
Nou nous pencherons ici sur plusieurs questions qu pose la condui te de la politique 
monétaire dans un tel cadre. Plus précisément , nous comparons diff ' r nt s règles suivies 
par des autorités monétaires déterminées à assurer la stabilité des prix, ain i que les 
répercussions de ces règles sur les propriétés dynamiques des agrégats économique . 
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L'adoption de la ver ion de peti te économie ouverte implique qu des variables 
étrangères peuvent être inclu es dan chaque équation du modèle, ce qui génère plus 
de dynamique dan ce genre de modèle. Ces différences peuvent influencer le ré ul tats 
déjà obtenus dans la littérature pour le régime hybride. Notre étude se démarque de la 
littérature exi tante3 du fait qu 'on adopte un cadre d 'analyse néo-Keynésien auquel on 
applique une analyse de bien-être économique. Avec es fond ment microéconomique 
ce cadre d 'analy ·e a l'avantage de s'approcher plus de la réalité économique et donc 
à donner des résultats intéressantes quand à l'étude des polit iques monétaires et à la 
comparaison entre différentes règles de conduite de cette poli t ique. 
Après avoir calibré le modèle sur l'économie canadienne et analy é les différentes 
répon e aux chocs frappant l'économie, on évalue les différents régim en se basant 
sur la perte du bien-être de chaque régime. Les résultats obtenu montrent que le modèle 
hybride peut , s' il est adopté, fournir une bonne alternative aux régime ciblant unique-
ment le taux d 'inflation ou le niveau de prix , la perte de bien-être de l 'agent économique 
étant négligeable. 
3Parmi ces études on peut citer Batin i et Yates (2003) et I<obayashi (20011) qu i ont a nalysé le régime 
hybride dan des cadre d 'analy e différents de celui qu'on adopte dans ce t ravail. 
CHAPITRE I 
EQUITY PREMIUMS IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY 
1.1 Introduction 
In recent years the front iers between financial economics and macroeconomics have 
steadily narrowed. Indeed , many empirical studie focus on the behavior of asset prices 
in relation to consumption and other business cycle variables. General equilibrium mo-
dels have been successful in explaining the dynamics of macroeconomic aggregate , but 
have failed to replicate similar interesting stylized facts when studying the behavior of 
asset prices. Empirically, financial economic studies have documented important cyclical 
variations in security returns and risk premia. 
To some extent, during the last two decades the principal quest ion in most business 
cycle stuclies has been to reconcile data and economic theory, and t herefore construct 
models wi th nclogenou processes able to generate the fluctuations ob erved in the 
data. In fact , the data (taken from postwar quarterly data for the industrialized coun-
tries) show for example that consumption i smooth and that the covariance between 
quarterly r al consumption growth and r al dividend growth is very weak. Nevert heless, 
the study of the equity premium can be seen as a prime example of where these models 
fall apart. 
In fact, among the abundant literature t reating the relation between conomic fluc-
tuations and as et prices, the endowment mode! of Lucas (1978) was the first to be 
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established as a baseline. A financial as et mode! based on consumption wa later in-
troduced by Hansen and Singleton (1983). In this kind of model the quantity of risk 
in the financial market is measured by the covariance of the exce · t ock return with 
consumption growth, while the risk price i the coeffi cient of the representative agent 's 
relative risk aversion. Based on the data1 however the average stock return is very high 
and the riskless interest rat e is low. This mean there is high expected exce s return on 
stock (the equity premium), while on the other band the data reveals low covariance 
between stock returns and consumption. In this case only a very high coeffi cient of risk 
aversion can explain the high equity premium, which Mehra and Prescott (1985) have 
called the 'equity premium puzzle' . 2 
Our purpose here is to introduc a foreign sector to the model studied by Jermann 
(199 ),3 and in this way permit the representative household to have access to financial 
credits on the foreign economy. Incorporating th foreign sector will thus provide another 
opportunity for agents to smooth their consumption . With this in mind we study 
the model's bu, iness cycle and asset pricing implications , enabling us to determine 
whether the results obtained by preceding studies4 will hold once the foreign economy 
is introduced. This essentially allows us to study equity premium behavior , in the ca e 
of a small open economy, with habit persistence in preferences and adjustment costs of 
capital, the case we intend to assess here. 
Kandel and Stambaugh (1991) , in response to the equity premium puzzle, argue that 
risk av rsion i much higher than what has been traditionally thought. But, if agents 
are very risk averse, they have a strong desire to transfer wealth from a 'good ' period 
(with high consumption) to a 'bad ' period. Since consumption grows steadily over time, 
1For a urvey of t he stylized facts related to t he consumpt ion-asset pricing framework, see Campbell 
(2001 ). 
2See a lso Cochrane and Hansen (1992) and I<ocherlakota (1996) fo r more d tails on t his puzzle. 
A brief summary of t he other enigmas found in li terature concerns : 'the ri skfree rate puzzle' in Weil 
(1989), ' the stock market volatili ty puzzle' in LeRoy and Porter (1981) and Shiller (1981); to quote 
only t he most documented. 
3The one sector version of the RB C mode] with adjustment cost of capi tal and fi xed labor. 
'
1These inclucle J ermann (1998), Benninga and Protopapaclakis (1990), Dant hine et al. (1992) and 
Rouwenhor t (1995). 
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the high risk aversion makes agents want to borrow in order to reduce the discrepancy 
between pre ent and future con umption. Campbell (2001) shows that to reconcile this 
with the low observed real interest rate, w must postulate that agents are very patient; 
thus they hav a low or even negative rate of time preference. Weil (1989) call thi the 
' risk-free rate puzzle' . 
Several studies tried tore olve those enigmas. One method was to introduce a class of 
utility fonctions and payout structures that could generat large variabili ty for con ump-
tion' marginal utility. A mode! with a representat ive agent whose utility displays habit 
formation, introduced by Sundaresan (1989) and Constantinides (1990) produces th i 
variabi li ty and can, in this way, resolve the puzzling equity premia problem. 
The idea behind the relative success of this ut ili ty fonction (as shown reccntly by 
Campbell and Cochran , 1999) , i that specification for habit formation make agent· 
more risk averse in bad times than in goocl t imes, when consumption is high compared 
to its past history. Thus the equity premium can be explained by the high volat ility of 
market tocks together with a reasonable degree of average I vel of ri. k aversion. 
evertheless, Rouwenhorst (1995) explains that in a closed economy, consumption 
smoothing must arise through capital accumulation. Thus , it is difficult to explain sub-
stantial risk premia because agent mooth their con umption when risk aversion in-
creases. The introduction of capital adju tment costs may however solve this problem 
and with appropriate specifications for the uti lity fonction , equ ity premiums with seve-
ral percentage points can be generated ( J ermann, 1994) . Indeed an extended v rsion of 
the RBC mode! including consumption habits may provide a key channel within which 
ri k premiums may be generated, because the agents in th is mode! become more risk 
averse. Consumption smoothness is desired here but when combined with capital a 1-
justment co t , tock return becomes ri ky and large equity premium may result (as 
shown by Budria, 2002). 
Constantinides (1990) demonstrates that in models with trivial production ctors, 
habit persistence in preferences may potentially account for both risk-free and equity 
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prernium asset price puzzles, while implying only a modest level of household risk aver-
sion. In addition to habit formation ,5 another ingredient needed to successfu lly obtain 
equity premia consist of tho e technology features that prevent households from smoo-
thing their consumption. Jermann (1998) shows that capital adjustrnent costs play a 
crucial role in this way. The mode! thus specified will not only explain the puzzling asset 
prices but also match a set of salient rnacroeconomic st atistics. 
Boldrin et al. (2001) introduce two modifications into the ·tandard real busine ·s cycle 
mode! : habit persistence preferences and limitations on factor mobility between the 
two sectors6 of the economy. The second assumption concerns the fact that the sectorial 
and aggregate allocations of capital and tabor are determined before the achievement 
of uncertainty in the current period . The resulting mode! is consistent with observed 
mean equity premiums and mean risk free rates. 
We follow J ermann (1998) through combining the loglinear reduced form along the 
lines of King, Plosser and R ebelo (1988) and the asset pricing formulae based on the 
lognormality of the distribution introduced by Hansen and Singleton (1983) , and more 
recently by Campbell (1986 and 1996). The framework presented here extends that of 
Jermann (1998) by introducing a foreign sector into the mode! and a 'risk premium' 
tenn to remove the model's built-in random walk property as shown below. A standard 
feature of most current open economy models is a relation implying uncovered interest 
parity (UIP) , despite its prominent empirical weaknesses as shown by McCallum and 
Nelson (2000) . 
Our results show that this mode! i not able to explain equity premium. Indeed 
the mode! generates small equity premiums when compared to that observed in the 
historical data. This failure can be attributable to the fact that , with access to inter-
national financial markets, domestic households may again play on the smoothing of 
their consumption. In this case the substantial addition brought to the st andard RBC 
5 Given its uccess in olving the puzzling equity premia in models including production. See Abel 
(1990) and Constantinides (1990). 
6Boldrin et a l. (1999) assume that consumpt ion and investment are non-homogeneous goods produced 
in separate sectors. 
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mode! by habit formation and capital adju tment co ts would be canceled by the ope-
ning of the economy to international financial markets . Addit ionally, domestic agents 
may reduce fluctuations in consumption by borrowing (or lending) from foreigner in 
bad (or good) periods. Nevertheless our mode! is able to match business cycle stati t ic , 
and compared to the standard RBC mode! it is better able to explain equi ty premia in 
several basis points . 
Thi chapter is structured as fo llows. Section 1.2 presents the mode! setting and dis-
eusses its solution, Section 1. 3 examines the mode! predictions and pre ents the results, 
and Section 1.4 contains concluding remarks. 
1. 2 The model 
1. 2.1 Madel Setting 
We consider the case of a small open economy7 with a continuum of ident ical infi-
nitely lived households. The representative agent in both countries (the home country 
and the rest of the world) maximizes the expected discounted sum of utility. There is 
a single consumption/ investment good in the world , produced by domestic and foreign 
firms according to constant-returns-to-scale production technology, such that import 
and local production are perfect substitute . Each firm finances its inve tment through 
retained earnings . 
Firms 
We assume that the representa tive domestic firm, which i owned by dome t ic hou-
seholds, has two types of purchasers, who are domestic and foreign customers to whom 
it may sell its goods. In each period the firm has to decide how much labor to hire and 
how much t o invest. T he manager ' problem i to maximize the value of the firm to it· 
7 T he mode! is a modi ficat ion of the one-sector, fixed labor mode!. 
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00 
· At+j 
Et I:; /31 --{Yi+j - wt+jnt+j - ft+j} 
j=O At 
subject to the constraint given below 
(1.1) 
where f]j At+j/ At is the marginal rate of substitution of the household and nt the quan-
t ity of labor input. The state of technology evolves according to the AR(l) process 
(1.2) 
where Ezt is a normally distributed white noise with mean O and variance Œ2 for ail 
t ~ o. 
Prior research - in the case of closed economy - has found that endogenous consump-
tion becomes even smoother as risk aversion is increased . In thi way, it is more difficult 
to explain substantial risk premia (Rouwenhorst, 1995). The intuition behind this is 
that agents can easily alter their production plans to smooth their consumption. Thus, 
with this frictionless and instantaneous capital stock adj ustment, this problem cannot 
be solved. J ermann (1994) suggests the introduction of capital adjustment costs in order 
to overcome thi weaknes . The specification of the fon ct ion follows Jermann (1998) , 
that is, 
where </J (.) is a positive, concave function. 9 Thus, the resources allocated to inve tment 
are not transformed into the next period capital with a rate equal to one. The parameter 
ç is the elasticity of investment, ft , with respect to Tobin 's q , and a 1, a2 are cho en o 
8The val ue of t he firm is equal to Lhe present discount value of ail current a nd fu t ure expected cash 
flows (as shown by J ermann , 1998) . Here for t he financing path we use the Mod iglian i- Miller theorem. 
9T he concavity of t he cost fun ction captures t he idea that changing capital stock rapid ly costs more 
than changing it slowly ( ee Eisner and Strotz ,1963 and Lucas and Prescott, 1971). 
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as to yield a balanced growth pa th , for t hose variable in the mode! that are invariant 
to ( (see Boldrin et al. , 2001 for more letails). 10 The value of ç strongly affects the 
concavity of the adjustment cost function. Indeed as shown in F igure 1.1,11 the function 
</>( .) is more concave when ç i low. 
The technology for accumulating capital is as follows 
O<ô< l. (1.3) 
where ô is the depreciation rate of capital. 
Therc are no new shar s i ·ued by the firm and the capital stock is financed through 
retained earning (RE), defined as 
h = REt. 
The dome ti hou ·ehold has acccss to incompletc international fin ancial markets, 
because the only foreign as et they can hold is a risk-free bond whose rate of return 
is exogenously det rmined. In th is case the initial conditions, in particular the home 
country's init ial foreign debt position, govern the model's st ady state values. As a 
consequence, a random walk12 component can prevent the model's dynamic equilibrium 
from reaching a table olution. To induce stationarity and remove the model's built-
in random walk property, we use an endogenous country-specific risk prcmium term 
"-t, that reflects departures from uncovered interest parity (UIP).13 Following Senhadji 
(1995), Mendoza and Uribe (2000), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003), and Dib (2003), 
this risk premium term i · given by 
10Here, as in Boldrin et a l. (2001 ), we set a,and a2 to : 
a1 = (exp(x) - 1 + 8)(1 /0, a2 = ,~\~1{) (1 - ô - exp(x)). 
11 The figure is taken from Budrfa, (2002) who use the same calibration and funct ional form that we 
use. 
12 At least one eigenvalue in t he mode! is equal to unity. 
13T hat is, t he equilibrium steady state is un ique and the mode] i stationary ( ee Dib 2003) . 
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(1.4) 
where Ë; is the average of aggregate foreign debt and cp mea ures the level of risk 
premium. The tenn risk premium implies that the equilibrium is unique and induces 
stationari ty in the mode!. At equilibrium the market clearing condi t ion yield 
Ë! = B! for all t . 
There are three assets in this economy that are traded in incompletc fin ancial mar-
kets. Household can then purchase a perfect ly divisible equity share of the representativc 
domestic firm that is a claim to an infi ni te stream of the firm dividends (At); so at 
time t , thi asset delivers a payout ( dividends) denoted by Dl . This asset can be pur-
chased only by domest ic households14 who must pay Pt to obtain it. They can also 
purchase two types of one-period riskless bonds (dome tic and foreign bond ). At th 
end of period t , the firm ' dividends to shareholders satisfy the following equation 
Households 
The representative agent derives ut ili ty from con umption of a final good Cl· The 
preferences exhibit a simpl form of habit formation, that is a stock of past consumption 
Xt that affects current utility 
0 <,8< 1 (1.5) 
14 It is as umed here that fo reigners purchase only t hose bonds denomina ted in their own outpu t. 
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where , is a positive parameter 15 different from l. The habit stock Xl evolves as follows 
Xl = bCl-1 (1.6) 
wherein we define the case where b > 0 as the habit persistence preference case. vVhen 
b = 0, these preferences correspond to those in a standard RBC model with fixed labor. 16 
In the case of habit persistence in the utility function , the representa tive agent is 
concerned with maintaining the same level of consumption period by period. As shown 
by Con tantinides (1990) and Lettau and Uh lig (1997) , the coeffic ient of relative r isk 
aversion , , must not be high, because in this case relative risk aversion becomes more 
sensible. To show this we can compute elasticity of intertemporal substitu tion (ES) 
and relative ri k aversion (RRA) . Following Lettau and Uhlig (1997) and Allais et al. 
(2000) , and assuming that the logarithm of consumption follows a random walk with 
drift yield 
Ct+ l = g + Ct + é tH · 
The inverse of ES is given by17 
l , 1 + /3b2 exp (- (, + l)g) 
ES= (1- bexp(-g) )( l - /3bexp(- 1g) ) 
and the RRA follows 
RRA= ' 1- bexp(-g) exp(-"fg)-/'h 
exp(- 'Yg)-b'Y 
Evidently, with no habit persistence (b = 0) the inverse of ES is simply,. Moreover , 
relative risk aversion is strongly related to the habit parameter .18 . 
15 In t he specia l case where 'Y ----> 1 , the Jogari t hmic fun ction is obtained . 
16T he term bCt-i can be seen as the household 's habi t tock, t hus, b cannot be negative. 
17See Let tau and Uhlig (1997) for more deta ils. 
18 Alla is et a l. (2000) compute the RRA and ES for Canada and a rgue that t he presence of habit 
formin g in preference is likely to reach the va lue found in t he da ta, and the mode! similar to wha t we 
present here can bet ter account for price changes for fin ancial assets. 
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In its portfolio the hou ehold has a domestic firm share and can also purchase 
one type of one period riskless bond Bt ( dome t ic risk-free bond19 ) denominated in 
consumption units for P/. It may also make a period t acquisit ion of one bond Bt, 
denominated on foreign output redeemed for one unit of foreign output one period 
la ter. The price20 the household must pay for this bond is K,t - 1 P{*- 1 . Thu , the price 
households must pay increases the ratio of foreign-debt to output, where the rate of 
return on At is conditional to date t + 1 tate of nature achievement while those on Bt 
and Bt are not. The two riskless bonds pay one unit of the consumption good (for each) 
at time t + 1 and expire. 21 
Let Ot = [Bt, At, B t] be the asset vector that contains the domestic firm shares 
and assets described above. Likewise, let Vi;° and Df denote the asset price vector and 
current period payouts respectively. 
The budget con traint is then given by the following inequality 
(1. 7) 
where Wt is the wage rate. 
Since the representative firm does not issue new shares at date t , the household takes 
At-1,Bt-1,B;_1,Xt-l as given and maximizes 
subject to the habit persistence con traint X t = bC, the budget constraint in (1. 7) and 
the technology funct ion (1.1). 
The gross domestic product Yi can either be usecl for consumption or investment 
19 As in J ermann (1998), we suppose that the possib ility of bankruptcy is excl uded, so that t he 
corporate and riskfree bonds are perfect sub titutes. 
20McCall um and Nelson (1998) suppose a random "risk-prem ium" term that refl ects tempora ry but 
persistent departures from uncovered interest par ity, whi le here instead we assum e an endogenous pre-
mium term to induce stationari ty into our small open economy mode!. 
21 Domestic r iskless bonds are assumed to be in aggregate zero supply. 
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a n d  t o  p a y  f o r e i g n  d e b t ,  o r  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  s u r p l u s  ( s e e  a p p e n d i x  A  f o r  d e t a i l s ) .  
G e n e r a l  E q u i l i b r i u m  M o d e !  S o l u t i o n  
G e n e r a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  m o d e !  s o l u t i o n s  u s u a l l y  i n v o l v e  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  l i n e a -
r i z a t i o n  m e t h o d  d e v e l o p e d  b y  K i n g ,  P l o s s e r  a n d  R e b e l o  ( 1 9 8 8 ) .  T h i s  m e t h o d  i m p l i e s  
t h a t  e x p e c t e d  r e t u r n s  a r e  e q u a l  a c r o s s  s e c u r i t i e s ,  s o  t h a t  r i s k  p r e m i u m s  c a n n o t  b e  s t u d y .  
D a n t h i n e  e t  a l .  ( 1 9 9 2 )  s h o w  t h a t  t h e  u s e  o f  a  s o l u t i o n  t e c h n i q u e  w i t h  n o n l i n e a r  f o n c t i o n s  
c a n  y i e l d  i n t e r e s t i n g  r e s u l t s .  
F o l l o w i n g  J e r m a n n  ( 1 9 9 4 ) ,  w e  u s e  a  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  l o g l i n e a r  a n d  l o g n o r m a l  e n -
v i r o n m e n t s . 2 2  T h e  s o l u t i o n  i n  t h i s  c a s e  i s  t o  s o l v e  f o r  t h e  m o d e l ' s  a p p r o x i m a t e  d y n a m i c  
r e p r e s e n t e d  b y  a  l o g l i n e a r  s t a t e  s p a c e  s y s t e m  o f  t h e  f o r m  S t =  M s t - 1  +  E t ,  w h e r e  M i s  
t h e  s q u a r e  m a t r i x  t h a t  g o v e r n s  t h e  s y s t e m ' s  d y n a m i c s .  T h i s  s t e p  i n v o l v e s  l o g l i n e a r i z i n g  
t h e  f i r s t  o r d e r  c o n d i t i o n s  a n d  s o l v i n g  t h e  d y n a m i c  s y s t e m .  
T h e  s e c o n d  s t e p  i n v o l v e s  t h e  l o g n o r m a l  p r i c i n g  f o r m u l a  u s e d  b y  H a n s e n  a n d  S i n g l e -
t o n  ( 1 9 8 3 )  a n d  C a m p b e l l  ( 1 9 9 3 ) .  I n  t h i s  f o r m u l a ,  t h e  r a n d o m  f u t u r e  p a y o u t  o f  d i v i d e n d  
c a n  b e  e v a l u a t e d  b y  t h e  p r e s e n t  v a l u e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  ( s e e  J e r m a n n  1 9 9 4  f o r  m o r e  d e t a i l s )  
V i . [ D t + k ]  =  / i E t [ A t + k D t + k ]  
A i  
w h e r e  A t  i s  t h e  m a r g i n a l  n u m e r a i r e  v a l u a t i o n  a t  p e r i o d  t .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  t h e  r e l a t i o n s  
b e t w e e n  t h e  d i v i d e n d  p a y o u t  a n d  t h e  m a r g i n a l  v a l u a t i o n  o n  t h e  o n e  h a n d  a n d  t h e  s t a t e  
v e c t o r  o n  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  p a s s  t h r o u g h  t h e  f a c t o r s  l d  a n d  l ; . .  a s  f o l l o w s  
> . . i  =  l ; . . s i  
d t  
l d S t ,  
( 1 . 8 )  
w h e r e  t h e  e r r o r  t e r m s  a r e  a s s u m e d  t o  f o l l o w  a  m u l t i v a r i a t e  n o r m a l  i i d  p r o c e s s .  
2 2  
A s  i n  J e r m a n n  ( 1 9 9 4 ) ,  w e  a s s u m e  t h a t  t h e  s y s t e m ' s  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  s t a t i o n a r y .  
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1.2 .2 Numeraire Valuation 
In our model the valuation ( or marginal utility ht ,) is computed as follows 
(1.9) 
Then through loglinearizing (1.9) and taking its first order Taylor series approxima-
t ion around the steady state of consumption (c), it can be shown that 
ht = 
- -y ,(1 + /3b2 ) Ct - c 
log[(( l - b) c) (1 - /Jb)J - (l - b) (l _ /3b) (-c-) + 
, b Ct- 1 - C ,/Jb Ct+I - C 
(1-b)(l-/Jb)( C )+(1-b)(l-/Jb)( C ). (1.10) 
Next , we approximate Ci.c-c as the difference between log of time t consumption and 
the log of st eady state consumption, i. e. 
Ct - C 
-- ~ log(Ct) - log(c), 
C 
to finally compute the following expression for ht 
ht = log[( (l - b) c) - 'Y( l - /Jb)J + , [b(f--b~~1-_
1
;b) l ] log(c) 
,(1 + /3b2 ) , b ï/Jb 
- (1 - b)(l - /Jb) Ct + (1 - b)(l - /Jb) Ct- l + (1 - b)(l - /Jb) Ct+l · (l.ll) 
where Ct stands for the log of the time t consumption expenditure. 
In this formula we can ignore the constant term when evaluating the relation between 
consumption expendit ure and realized marginal ut ility ht, and marginal valuation At . 
Thus, we can approximate the marginal utility locally by 
,/Jb ,(1 + /3b2 ) , b 
ht = (1- b)(l - /Jb) ct+ l - (1 - b)(l - /Jb) Ct + (1 - b)(l - /Jb) Ct-l· 
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Now we turn to the ri k premium i sue. 
1.2.3 Risk Premium Computation 
We let I-ft ,t+s be lifet ime marginal utility and then we assume the fo llowing relation 
between its log, (hl ,t+s) and a distributed lead of the state vector's log23 
s 
ht,l+s = L l1i(j)st+j· 
j=O 
(1.12) 
Therefore, we can evaluate time t expectations over the lifet ime marginal utili ty 
within the fr amework of asset pricing case as follows 
Et(Hl,l+s) = El exp(hl ,l+s). 
Assuming that Hl,t+s is normally dist ributed, lognormality implies that the right 
hand side (RHS) of the above equation can be rewitten as 
Consequently, the value of a claim to a potentially random future payout Dt+k 
reduce to 
V,(D ) _ /3kEt(ex p(ht+k,t+s+k)Dt+k) t t+k - . El exp(ht,t+s) (1.13) 
U ing the law of iterative expectations, the numerator of (1.13) can be rewritten as 
Given that Dt+k is deterministic at t+k, and under the lognormality a sumption, 
23In what fo llow we use t he pre entat ion of Jermann (1994). 
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the previous expression becomes 
1 
Et[exp(Et+k(ht+k,t+s+k) + 2vart+k(ht+k,t+s+k ))Dt+kl· 
Furthermore, with the variance term which does not depend on the state of the system, 
(1. 13) then reduces to 
Moreover , as the two variance terms cancel out, it follows that 
( ) (Jk Et( exp(Et+k (ht+k,t+s+k) )Dt+k) vt Dt+k = , 
exp(Etht,t+s) (1.14) 
so that At = exp(Etht,t+s) can be usecl as the marginal numeraire valuation . 
Ex pect e d R eturn 
Following J ermann (1998), we focus on single-payout assets in order to definc a 
one-periocl holding return as 
(1.15) 
Hence, we first have to evaluate the per iod t expectecl value of Vt+1 (Dt+k). The lognor-
mality assumption therefore implies that 
k 1 1 (J - Et exp[(Et+1(dt+k + ht+k - ht+1) + 2vari+1(dt+k + ht+k)J 
(Jk- l exp[Et(dt+k + ht+k - h t+1) + ~vart(Et+1(dt+k + ht+k - hi+1)) 
1 
+ 2vart+l ( dt+k + ht+k) J. 
23 
The conditional expectation on the holding return can then be calculated as follows 
Et[Rt,t+1 (Dt+k)] 
As we assumed early on, the variance term is state-independent so that 
As a result, 
which can be shown to reduce to 
or, alternatively, 
EdRt,t+l (Dt+k)] = R t,t+ l (li+1) exp[-covt(ht+1 , Et+1 (ht+k-ht+1))-cov1(ht+1, Et+1 (dt+d)] 
(1.16) 
which is the conditional expected ret urn. 
As shown by Jermann (1994), even though the RHS of this equation can be divided 
into three components, 24 we are only interested in the first term which represents the 
24 See J erma nn (1998) for more details on this specification. The three components are : ri skfree rate, 
the term uncertainty premium which represents the term premium for a k-period discount bond and 
the last element, which is t he payout uncer tain ty prem ium. 
24 
risk-free rate 
l /1ft[ l t+1] (1.17) 
- 1 1 (3 exp(ht - Etht+l - 2vart(ht+1)). 
In order to quantify the equity premium, we need to obtain the risk-free rate 's condi-
t ional expectation. To do so let us first compute the conditional variance. 
Conditional Variance 
With the lognormality assumption it is possible and useful to compute the condi-
tional variance of asset returns. As by definition25 
(1.18) 
and focus ing on the RHS , it can be shown that 
Vt+1[Dt+k] 
Et(Vt+1 [Dt+k]) 
As a result, 
exp(Et+1(dt+k + ht+k - ht+1) - Et(dt+k + hi+k - ht+1) 
1 
- 2vart(Et+ldt+k + ht+k - h t+1)). 
(1.19) 
which represents the conditional variance of asset returns. 
25 Here we use the fact that : 
1 _ E,(Ri . t+ t1Dt+ k ]) 
Vt[ Dt + kJ - E, ( Vi + 1 ID, + .J ) . 
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1.3 Model Predictions 
1.3.1 Market Equilibrium 
The market-clearing condition for the goods market requires that ail produced final 
goods be consumed, invested or used in order to pay capital adju tment costs and 
period a set returns. If we normalize the number of households and firms to one, then 
the resource constraint holds in an equal manner , and also labor demand equals labor 
supply. Financial market equilibrium occurs when agents hold ail outstanding shares 
and corporate bonds26 and ail other assets are in zero supply. The sequence of markets 
equilibrium i defined as usual. 
1.3 .2 Model Calibration 
The values as igned to mode! parameters are those estimated by Letendre (2003) for 
the Canadian economy. Certain other values have been chosen from the literature so that 
the mode! can reproduce some small open economy features. We consider parameter 
within the range of values generally considered as being linkecl to the habit formation 
(HF) case . Indeecl the preference parameter, is set to 2. As discussed in Jermann (1998) 
and Budrfa (2002), in the case of HF preferences this parameter is clo e to risk aversion. 
Campbell (1993) estimates this value to be between 5 and 8, but mean reversion in asset 
prices may increase this value by up to three times (Black, 1990). Boldrin et al. (1995) 
assume a value of 1 for the HF case . The depreciation rate is set to 0.025 , the subjective 
discount factor is set to 0.96, and the steady tate value of n to 0.33 . Also the steady state 
risk premium parameter cp is set to 0.0054, which implies an average risk premium of 98 
basis points at an annual rate (as in Clinton , 1998, reporting estimates for Canada). The 
capital share in production is set to 0.32, the parameter of habit per istence b to 0.58. 
Cochrane and Hansen (1992) use 0.5 and 0.6 for this parameter, while Constantinides 
(1990) requires a level of 0.8 . 
26T he domestic corporate bonds are detain d by domestic agents. 
26 
The elasticity of investment with respect to Tobin q is estimat d in the literature to 
have values ranging from 0.4 to 1.14. Abel (1980) estimat es this parameter to be between 
0.27 and 0.52, and Jermann (1998) sets ç equal to 0.23 , which is the high adjustment 
cost case. We adopt thi parametrization and set ç to 0.23. Finally the productivity 
shock parameter is set to 0.9443627 as estimated by Letendre (2003) for Canada, with 
a standard deviation of 0.00599. See Table 1.1 for a summary of these values. 
1. 3 .3 Mode! Solut ion 
As shown by Boldrin et al. (1999) and Jermann (1988) , in the RBC mode! the equity 
premium is low. Intuitively, this re ult is due to the fact that in RBC models the Sharpe 
ratio for equity (SR) and the standard deviation for real return to equity, CTr • , are low. 
Hence, for a production economy defining the equity premium as E (rf+ i -r{ ) = SR.ure 
naturally leads to a low value for t he premium. Indeed, the equi ty premium remains at 
zero and the result is invariant to the introduct ion of habit persistence in the utility 
function. 28 As discussed before the introduction of adjustment cost of capital in a mode! 
with habit preference and fixed worked hours increases CTr • to a large value and this 
yields a substantial equity premium. 
In the case of the lognormal pricing mode!, we as ume that the dividend (Dt) and 
the marginal valuation (At) are lognormal. The joint distribution is given by the vec-
tor process for state variables. In this case, the equity premium as defined is usually 
computed as the difference between the uncondit ional mean equi ty return and the un-
conditional mean risk-free rate, thus we neecl to apply the lognormal pricing formulae to 
the two rates (on the equity and risk-free rates), whereas the one period holding return 
is defined as 
2 7See Prescott (1986) for a discussion of Solow residual est imates. 
2 In our mode] the change in b let the equity wit h no significant change. 
for k period asset holding . In the risk-free rate case the expression becomes 
J - l 
Rt,t+1 - v; (1 ) . 
t t+k 
Following Jermann (1998), the risk-free rate can thus be rewritten as 
27 
(1.20) 
where Àt is the logarithm of the valuation, At . The unconditional expectation corres-
ponding to (1.20) is then given by 
which is trivially computed from the model solu tion . However , a lthough return to the 
firm 's equity can be written as 
it is still difficult to get an analytical closed form ·olu t ion for the uncondi t ional cxpec-
tation of this return. As shown by Jermann (1998) we can overcome this shortcoming 
by applying numerical simulation. 
1.3.4 Summary of Numerical Results 
The models ' predictions for mean returns and business cycle statistics are shown in 
Tables 1.2 and 1.3. The results obta ined show that the equi ty premium computed using 
the lognormal formulae is about 0.025% (2.5 basis points annually), which is extremely 
low when comparecl to the premium obtained using historical data . For example Allais et 
al. (2000) report an equi ty premium of 3.47% for Canada. See Table 1.2 for a summary 
of results, with Canaclian data used for comparison purposes. 
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T his means that even with habit persistence in preferences and capital adjustment 
costs, the model fai ls to account for a substantial equity premia when a foreign sector is 
introduced. This failure can be explained by the smoothing of household consumption 
when confronted with fluctuations in their consumption plans. In this case they can 
borrow from or lend to a foreign country to obtain the same level of consumption. 
As explained before with habit persistence, economic agents are not only concerned 
by the actual level of consumption, but they are also intended to maintain the same 
consumption level period by period. 
Despite this failure, the mode! is able to provide high equity premiums compared 
to tho ·e obtained by the standard RBC mode! (which gives no equity), and i also 
able to match elected business cycle statistics . For example, the standard deviation of 
output is 1.78, compared to about 1.72 for the Canadian data. The relative deviation 
between consumption and output is about 0.179 while the data gives 0.54, which can be 
explained by the model's smoothness of consumption. In fact, consumption 's standard 
deviation at 0.32 is three times Jess vo latile compared to the value of 0.93 obtained in 
the data29 . These re ults how that the RBC mode! augmented with habit format ion 
and adjustment costs fails to account for asset pricing tatist ics when a n w element , 
the foreign sector, is introduced into the mode!. As discussed in Abel (1991), interest 
rate volatility is too high , representing a problem with habit persistence in that it 
makes this rate too volatile. Likewise, habi t formation preferences di play a strong 
aversion to intertemporal substitution which in turn leads to high variations in interest 
rates (J ermann, 1998) . Furthermore, the mode! overpredicts riskl ss rate volatility in 
part because a high value of the parameter that governs habit persistence is needed to 
generate a sizeable equity premium. In models of this class, if one is willing to increa e 
risk-aversion, less habit persistence is required to match mean as et returns, which 
simultaneously leads to lower volatility of the risk-free rate. However, Boldrin et al. 
(2001 ) point out that higher risk aver ·ion also has adverse implications for employment 
29T he consumpt ion volatili ty has dropped to 0.32. Basically, the agents in this economy u e t he 
near linear technology to smooth out con umption, counteracting the effect on risk premia that habit 
formation has on t he preference sicle. 
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dynamics in such models. 
1.3.5 Impulse Response F\mctions 
To get insight into the workings of the mode!, the second part of our analysis concerns 
a set of impulse re panses to a unit positive productivity shock. The impulse responses 
for this version of the mode!, under the baseline calibration in Table 1.1 are shown 
in Figure 1.2 and 1.3. In this kind of mode! the output and investment re pon es to 
unit positive productivity impulses are standard . The dividend responses how that 
the dividend are procyclical, as they are in the mode! 's closed economy version . Indeed 
Jermann (1998) found that, even with and without habit, dividends are more procyclical 
with respect to capital adjustment costs. The marginal utility response is also in line 
with wha t can be found in a closed economy version of the mode!, and it is negatively 
serially correlated with a hump-shaped response. Consumption a l o displays a hump-
haped response because, under habit formation , households smooth bath the level and 
the change in consumption. The peak of the consumption and marginal u t ility responses 
takes place a fter 10 quarters. Re panses of the other variables to uni t technology shocks 
correspond t o li terature standards. 
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1.4 Concluding Remarks 
Prior research on endowment model following Lucas (1978) and Campbell (1986) 
has focussed on various modifications of a standard RBC mode! in an effor t to resolve 
its puzzling pricing implications. In fact, the version of the RBC mode! containing habit 
persistence and capital adjustment costs properly accounts for equity premiums and 
other asset pricing components. 
The same model however when augmented by a foreign sector fails to generate 
substantial equity premiums nor explain equity generated by hi torical data in small 
open economy cases. 
Using the lognormal-loglinear mode! solution , in this chapter we evaluate asset prices 
in small open economy cases and highlight some shortcomings . First , as discussed above, 
the mode! generates low risk premia and its econd shortcoming is that , consistent with 
the finding of Heaton (1995) and Boldrin et al. (1999) the volatility of the risk-free 
(and risky) rate is too high, This is a typical problem for those utility functions that 
display habit formation. Habit persistence makes marginal utility very volatile, even 
for mooth consumption profiles (Budria, 2002). This creates large fluctuations of the 
expected marginal utility at successive dates, and also involves large movements in the 
risk-free rate. 
In summary, this mode! does well when compared to selected business cycle tatis-
t ics , but fai ls to improve the performances obtained using the clo ecl economy ver ion of 
the moclel with re ·pect to asset pricing. Obvious directions for future work inclucle esti-
mating the parameter u ed to generate the results, and finding feature of technology 
that can prevent households from smoothing their consumption in an open economy 
mode!. Incleed, if we can limit the access to foreign debt (assets) the moclel obtained 
can allows one to solve for as et returns. These area are a few of the many areas where 
further work might be focusecl in order to address the issue of bes t way to r olve the 
puzzle equity premium. 
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Tab. 1.1 : Mode! Calibration 
Parameter value assignecl 
Pz 0.94436 
()" z 0.00599 
/3 0.96 
x 0.0040 
a 0.32 
b 0.58 
ô 0.025 
'Y 2.0 
( 1/ 0.23 
cp 0.006 
Tab. 1.2: Equity Premium Statist ics 
Stati tics Mode! Data* 
E(re - r1) 0.0247 3.47 
u (re - rf) 79.252 15.53 
u(re) 78.864 na 
u(rf) 7.058 na 
u(~ ln(C)) 0.6822 2.04 
p(re - r f , ~ ln(C)) 0.004782 0.33 
cov(re - rf, ~ ln( C)) 0.2584 10.58 
* Data statistics are from Allais et al. (2000)(we report th case of Canada). 
Note : The first column represents the average excess return. The econd and fifth 
column are the standard-errors of the excess return and th consumption growth. 
In the la t two column the covariance and correlation coefficients between the 
excess return and the consumption growth are represented. 
Moments are averages of 100 replications of length 500. 
Tab. 1.3: Business cycle Stati tics 
Statistics Mode] Data* 
O'y 1.78003 1.72 
O'C 0.31971 0.93 
O' I 2.18099 5.13 
O'pe 1.50586 na 
O'D 1.52692 na 
u c/uy 0.17961 0.54 
uJ/uy 1.22526 2.98 
p(Y, C) 0.88255 o. 0 
p(Y, I ) 0.99038 0.77 
* Data stat istics are taken from Letendre (2003). 
Note : This study uses quarterly Canadian Data (from 1981Ql to 2001Q4) 
fil tered with HP (here we u e the ame filter for moment computations) . 
32 
7'; 1 IT 
0 
LIJ 
ro 1 .o:;; 
;:; 
oZ 
~· 'J 
oi 1 111 
"' ÛJ 
'"'"' ~ 
,J.) 
~ D.~e 
a., 
:·: l 'J' ~ . , 
:!:: 
; J. ClE 
,o 
u 
+ 1 1 11 
a) 
F ig . 1-1: The Cost or Adjustrnent Function 
(Source : Budrfa, 2002) 
~ - 1 
~ - 0 . .25 
~ J.9,1 '----- -----'---------'------1 ,, li 1 , 
l 1J11 e I IJ,Ve<s l/ rl >"i ll Jel,-d1 ·1 ... 1, :;1µ.-,, h· :.:1, 1..i h,v..i , l111 e/1I 
Note : This graphie i based on calibrations similar to what we u e in our mode!. 
33 
34 
Fig 2.2: Impulse Response F\mction to a Unit Technology Shock 
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Note: The impulse is a unit posit ive productivity shock, the responses are in percent devi-
ations from steady state values. 
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Fig 2.3: Impulse Response Function to a Unit Technology Shock 
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Note The valuation of numeraire is equivalent here to the marginal ut ility. 
CHAPITRE II 
THE MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF MONETARY POLICY 
AND FINANCIAL CRISIS 
2.1 Introduction 
There is a vast empirical literature regarding the effects of monetary policy on output 
and other macroeconomic aggregate . Indeed , considerable interest has been continually 
sustained among both policy makers and researcher · regarding the sources of business 
cycle fl uctuations, with emphasis being placed on various supply shocks and demand 
changes . Also, there is a rapidly growing li terature that pays special attention to mo-
netary policy shocks. A typical finding is that monetary shocks affect output with long 
delays , that their effect is highly persi tent , and t his accounts for the movement in ag-
gregate price levels. Inferences that can be made however regarding t he quantitative 
effects of monetary shocks critically depend on underlying identificat ion and estimation 
schemes (Christiano , Eichenbaum, and Evans, 1999). 
A monetary policy shock is defined as the portion central bank policy variation not 
eau ed by sy tematic responses to variation in t he state of t he conomy. With this in 
mind , t he purpose of this study is to determine whether monetary policy shocks have 
any effect on a real economy, while focus ing on the economy 's regular responscs to shock 
behavior. 
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Furthermor , the identification of monetary shocks is not without controversy. In-
deed , estima tes made of the macrocconomic effects of monetary policy often differ from 
one study to the next with regard to both their t iming and magnitude [see, for example, 
Christiane, Eichenbaum , and Evans (1994, 1999), Gordon and L per (1994) and Leeper , 
Sims, and Zha (1996)]. We thus examine whether major conclusions made by alternative 
specifications of our empirical mode! holcl up . First , given that it is arguable whether 
monetary policy will respond to variables not already included in empirical work, we 
examine how controlling for other shocks (namely, market crashes and oil price changes) 
might alter the apparent real effects of monetary shocks. Second , controversy also exists 
as to whether monetary author ities should r a t to asset price movem nts. Similarly, we 
examine the effects of stock market crashes on the real economy. We begin our study 
by examining the exogeneity of both type · of perturbations, and then analyze their 
implications on macro variables. 
vVhile the exogeneity of the monetary policy shocks is well documented in the lite-
rature, nothing has yet clone regarding the new Romer and Romer (2004) m asure and 
regarding stock market crashes. Given that their exogenous nature has been questioned , 
our obj ective here is to study the effects of the shocks - to moneta ry policy and stock 
market crashe - on variou · macro variable , and then assess the real effect of these 
shocks on the economy. The accuracy of stimates made of these effects depends essen-
tially on the measures for monetary policy and stock market collapse variables being 
used. For the purposes of this study and in orcler to construct a dummy variable, we use 
the new US monetary policy shocks measure recently developed by Rom r and Romer 
(2004) along with the dates highlighted by Mi hkin and White (2002) . 
We also u e a procedure that was first uscd by Leeper (1997) to study the exogeneity 
of the monetary clummies developed by Romer and Romer (1989, 1994).1 This metho-
dology combine the narrative approach with vector autoregression (VAR) in order to 
verify wheth r both shocks are contaminated by substant ia l endogenous components. 
1 Following t his methodology, Leeper (1997) a rgues that the Romers ' (1994) moneta ry dummy is not 
exogenous, meaning t hat this dummy is contaminated by a substant ia l endogenous component. 
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For this r eason a logit equation for the financial dummy variable is estimated , after 
which we compute the probabilitie that the dummy variable take the value one at 
the date selected by Mishkin and White (2002), using a narrative approach . Two VAR 
system are then estimated, and finally the impul e re ponse fonctions are analyzed . 
Following Leeper (1997), the basic VAR has seven variables : industrial production 
(Y), con umer prices (P) , the 3-month Treasury bill rate (R3), the 10-year U.S. Treasury 
bond yielcl (RlO) , total reserves (TR), the price of commodi ties (PCM) and finally 
monetary hock or a market crash dummy. Al! variables are measured in log except 
for interest rates, which are measured in percentage points. 
First , we estimate two VARs, called 'Financial VAR' for the one incorporating the 
financial crisis variable, estimated over a sample period extencling from 1960M01 to 
2000Ml2 and 'Monetary VAR' for the new mon tary policy measure built by Romer 
and Romer (2004) , covering a period 1969M01 to 1996Ml2. Then , we incorporate the 
financial crash dummy and the monetary policy shock into the same VAR, combining 
them both to estimate the effects of each. 
As was mentioned above, our measure of monetary shocks is the new measure de-
veloped recently by Romer and Romer (2004) which they based on their interpretation 
of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting reports, combined with in-
forma tion on Fecleral Reserve expected fund rates. See Figure 2.1 for the new monetary 
policy measure computed by the authors. For reasons of readabi lity, the monthly va-
lues are converted into quarterly observations and display a continuous series, capturing 
changes in the intended movement in the fund rate around the FO fC meetings. The 
idea then is that this measure should be purged of the movements in the economy that 
are anticipa ted by the Fed, so that it reflects purely exogenous , unanticipated changes 
in monetary conditions. 
Romer and Romer (2004) incorporate their monetary policy hock measure in a 
VAR, based on that of Chri t iano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996). They e t imate a 
three-variable VAR including output (mea ured by industria l production), producer 
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price index (PPI for finished goods) and their new monetary policy measure. They 
find that mon tary policy shocks have both strong and statistically significant effects 
on output. They also show that a negative monetary policy shock genera te · a trong, 
negativc price response. T hey argue that their ·bock mea ure creates a tronger effect 
on output (see Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 1996 ; Romer and Romer , 1994; 
Barth and Ramey, 2001 and Boivin, 2001 ). 
As for stock market crashes,2 we use the da tes computed by Mishkin and White 
(2002). In the pirit of Hamilton (1983) and Romer and Romer (1989, 1994), the author 
apply a narrative approach to identify the stock market collapses in the United States 
over the las t one hundred years. 
In their study, Mishkin and White (2002) argue that financial market crashes de-
crease aggregate demand through reducing wealth and raising the co t of capital. This 
may also reduce consumer spending and real inves tment. 3 Thus, st ock market pertur-
bations can produce additional stress on the economy,4 pos ibly leading to intervent ion 
by the central bank. For example, the monetary authorities may react to movements in 
stock price in order to stop bubbles from getting out of band, or alternatively try to 
prop up the tock market following a crash through adopt ing an expansionary policy 
stronger than the one indicated by straightforward effects on aggregate macroeconomic 
variables (Mishkin and White, 2002). These strategies are applied only if stock market 
crashes have the potent ial to de tabilize the fi nancial system and to produce more stress 
on the economy. 
Based on their historical analysis of all stock market cra hes in the twent ieth century 
in the Uni ted States, Mishkin and White (2002) identify major collapse of the financial 
2 Also called financia l crisis in this work . 
3 Central ban ks, t rying to conduct an optimal policy, should react to these fluctuat ion . T he manner 
in which this reaction is related to the effect of tock market pert urbations on aggregate clemancl is 
unclear (Mishkin and Whi te, 2002) . 
4 Th is stress should become visible in ri k premiums on interest rates. Note t hat crashes are not 
alway t he main cause of financia l instabili ty. Collapses of banking systems or severi ty of economic 
contractions a re a lso possible inclependent factors that could lead to fin ancial instabili ty (M ishkin and 
Whi te 2002) . 
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market. A stock market crash is defined here a a sudden dramatic lo s of share value for 
corporate stocks. However , as highlighted by the authors, attempting a prcci e definition 
and measurement of tock market crashes over the century i a difficult ta ·k. Key factors 
include the tock market index, the ize of the collapse and the duration of the crash. 
Indeed , using three stock indices5 and the universally agreed stock market crashes of 
October 1929, and October 1987 a benchmarks, they identi fy 15 major financial crise 
in the last century. 6 Since we have limited our analy is to the US postwar period , we 
construct a dummy variable representing the dates identified by Mishkin and White 
(2002) and zero oth rwise.7 These dates8 are : 1962 :04, 1970 :05, 1973 :11 , 1987 :10 , 
1990 :08, and finally 2000 :04. 
Our re ul t how empirical evidence that both financial cris s and monetary policy 
shocks are exogenous. These re ults remain relatively unchang d even when we include 
othcr exogcnous shocks in the VAR or when di fferent weights are given to fi nancial 
crisis epi ode .9 Furthermore, the logit equation for the financial crisis dummy doe not 
provide any rneaningful help in explaining this shock's exogeneity, since it is imprecisely 
estimatecl and leads to puzzling probabilities. 
These results suggest that it i · important that rnonet ary authorities take di Tup-
tions in the financia l market into account when asses ing moneta ry policy. Moneta.ry 
authority responses to asset price rnovements is an expanded and arnbitious mission for 
rnoneta.ry policy, but it might complicate inflation targeting procedures. Indeecl , rno-
netary policy is a m acroeconomic policy tool that should be used for macroeconomic 
5The authors use mont hly Dow Jone Industrials Index records, t he Standa rd and Poor 's 500 Index 
and fin a lly the NASDAQ ComposiLe Index Lo idenLify nominal crashes. 
6 A stock market crash is defin ed by a 20% drop in t he market combined with t he speed of the collap e 
by looking at declines over windows of t ime, where depth and speed are the main feat ures that define 
it . 
7 Wi t h t he stock market crash defin ed a a decline in stock prices, by constru t ion t he shocks high-
lighted by the authors a re of the ame sign. Dept h and speed of collapse might be d iffe rent but t hey 
have the same magni tudes. 
8Since data used in our empirical study covers t he period 1960M01 - 2000Ml 2. 
9Followi ng t he class ification pre ented by Mi hkin and Whi te (2002), w as ign different weight to 
fin ancial collap es, vary ing from one to four , according to crash category. 
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purpo es, not for single market, localized events, as in the financial market. However , a 
sugges ted by advocates of central bank intervent ion10 (in case of financial crisis) , asset 
price movements may lead to sizeable debt build-ups, weakened balance sheets and fi-
nancial imbalance (Saxton, 2003) . Such perturbations can generat e financial instabili ty 
and in turn, macroeconomic fluctuations. 
The remainder of thi chapter i tructured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the 
econometric methodology we use to estimate the VAR y tem . Section 2.3 cliscusses 
the econometric evidence on exogeneity fo r two kincls of shocks and present · the re ult 
Section 2.4 presents the concluding remarks. 
2.2 Econometric M ethodology 
The methodology implemented to investigate the exogeneity of different hock fol-
lows the work clone by Leeper (1997) and Horent (2002) in t heir examination of the 
exogenou effects of shocks on monetary and fiscal policy. 
In our empirical work, VAR systems have seven variables : ou tput, consumer prices, 
3-month Treasury bill rate, 10-year Treasury bond yield , price of commodi ties, total 
reserves and finally the hock con iclerecl. 11 The variables are in levels rather than in 
first differences, even though the series may be either non-stationary or cointegrated . 
The estimat es in this case yield consistent values for ail parameters, as pointecl ou t by 
Hamilton (1994) and Weise (1996), provided that the lags included in the estima tion 
are long enough. 
Enders (1995) and Lütkepohl (1991) how that in any VAR an important i sue is 
the selection of an adequate lag length and appropriate t ime t rend , and in this respect 
two main problem can be highlighted. First, if the lag length included in the system i 
too long, degrees of freedom are squandered . Second , the y tem may be mi - pecified 
10See Saxton (2003) fo r a urvey of t he li terature on cases for or against central bank intervent ion in 
fi nancia l crises cases. 
11 See appendix B for more details about t he data u ed in t his work. 
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if the appropriate t ime trend i not included or if the lag length elected is too short; 
this may yicld biased coeffi cient estimates and some autocorrelation problcms. 
2 .2 .1 Time Tre nd 
In order to te t for the presence of a time trend (linear and/or quadratic), we use 
the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Schwartz criterion (SIC). We te t both 
a linear and a quadratic time trend and to determine which i more appropriate, with 
the most adequa te sp cification being the one that minimizes criterion values. 
We also make use of likelihood ratio (LR) tati tics to te t for a null for a no time 
trend or alternatively for a linear trend. ext we assess a re tricted mode! with no trend , 
then an unrestrictecl mode! in which a linear and ( or without) qua lratic time trend are 
inclucl cl in the VAR. 12 
The resu lts show that including either a linear or quadrat ic time t rend i better 
than not including a time trend in the VAR systems. Indeed , based on computations 
for the information AIC and SIC criteria, we conclude that the best choices are linear 
and quadratic time t rends in financial and monetary VARs13 (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2). 
Table 2.3 hows the results of the LR test on both VARs. The nu ll hypothesis of the 
'no trend' against the 'linear trend ,' and alternately the 'linear and quadratic trend ' are 
tested . 
Note that including linear and quaclratic t rends cloes not ignificantly affect the 
results the two systems being studiecl, and furthermore the results are not ·ensitive to 
the addition of quadratic time trends. It is for this reason that in our empirical study 
we consicler a linear time trend in both VARs. 
12See Appendix C for more technical deLa ils on the formu la u ed to compute the different cri teria. 
13SIC suggests no t ime t rend in the monetary VAR. 
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2 .2.2 Lag Length 
We establish th optimal lag length using the information criteria . In fact , the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) and Schwartz criterion (SIC) are used to determine the lag 
length for the variable included in the VAR systems. Models with various lag lengths 
are estimated, and the corresponding AIC and SIC values are computed .14 The optimal 
lag lengt h is the one that minimizes the information criterion values.15 
The likelihood ratio (LR) is also used to valida.te t he choice of AIC and SIC cri teria. 
In thcir study Ramer and Romer (2004) use 36 lags in the baseli nc specificat ion for the 
monetary VAR. 16 Following Leeper (1997) and Ramer and Romer (2004), we consider 
36 lags as the maximum lag length for both systems. The nul! hypothesis of 36 lags 
ver us 35 lags is tested. T hen a restricted mode! with 35 lagged values for the variables 
in VAR is then estirna ted , fo llowed by an unrestrict d mode! with 36 lag , and fin ally 
the likelihood rat io ta ti t ics are cornputed. 17 If the likelihood ratio exceeds the critical 
value for the x2 distribution , at 5% significance level, the nul! for the 35 lags can be 
rejected , and the mode! with 36 lags would be preferred . 0 th rwi e, the nul! for 34 lags 
again t the alterna tive of 35 lags is tested . The same procedure is repeated unt il a nul! 
hypothe is is rejected. 18 
Tables 2.4 to 2.6 di play the results of the optimal lag length select ion for the VAR 
ystern variables (financial and rnonctary), as well as an appropri a.te time tr nd. 
Table 2.4 li ts the Likelihood Ra tio (LR), AIC and SIC tests carried out. It also 
indicat that AIC uggests 8 lags in the financial VAR and 36 lags in the monetary 
14 Lags from 1 to 36 a re included following Leeper (1997), who use 36 lags for the dummy variable 
and 24 lags for macro variables. I-Iere we use the maximum lag length to te t for t he opt imal one. 
15 It hould be no ted here t hat variou Monte Carlo stud ie usua lly compare t he lag order select ion 
criterion to find out which one would be be t able to select t he t rue log ord r mo t often (Nickelsburg, 
1985, Kilian, 2001 ). The lag order distr ibut ion resul t may be of t heoretical in tere t , but t hey a re of 
limited interest fo r applied users interested in VAR statistics such as forecasts or impulse re ·panses, as 
shown by Ki lian (2001 ). 
16See Appendix C fo r technical discus ion about LR, AIC and SIC 
17lt has a n asymptot ic x2 distr ibution with degr e of freedom equal to th number of re t rict ion · 
(one res t rict ion per equa t ion, which is seven for this tes t). 
18 \,Ve consider only t hose models whose endogenous and dummy variables have t he sam lag length . 
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VAR, while on the other hand LR suggests up to 36 and 21 lag in the financial and 
monetary VAR respectively, while SIC implies that including 1 lag is even better for 
both systems. 
This statistical evidence leads to different conclusions regarding the optimal lag 
length for t he two VARs. Based on the SIC, it seems better to includ one lag for 
the endogenous variables in the two ystems. However , the AIC suggests 8 lags for 
the financial VAR and 36 for the monetary system. LR found that 36 and 21 lags for 
financial and monetary systems is better respectively. 
Empirically, Killian (2001) presents a Monte Carlo study and concludes that the AIC 
has better finite sample proprieties when compared to other optimal lag length selection 
criteria . I-Iorent (2002) presents th same evidence by using impulse response fonctions 
to compare models where lag length order is select d bas d on different criteria. 
This section provides evidence as to which optimal lag length and t ime trend spe-
cification would be best used to estimate the systems under study. In what fo llow , as 
suggested by the AIC , in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 we consider a linear trend in bot h VARs.19 
Eight lags for macroeconomic variables and financial dummy variables are used in esti-
mating the financial VAR. We u e up to 36 lags for the monetary VAR, and include a 
constant term and seasonal dummy variables in our estimation. 
2.3 E conometric Eviden ce 
2 .3 .1 Shock Exogeneity 
P revious di eu sions neglect an obvions question as to whether the shocks tudied 
are exogenous, in the sense that may or may not be determined outside the system. 
19The inclus ion of a quadratic t ime trend in VAR systems does not sign ificant ly change re ul ts. 
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There are various notion of exogeneity and different ways to te t for it. 20 
In our stucly we have two kinds of shocks : monetary shocks and financial cns1s 
shock . Despite the fact that the exogeneity of monetary policy can be tested using 
standard methods, the exogeneity of any dummy variable is more problematic. Leeper 
(1997) suggests constructing a logit equation in order to e tabli h a binary variable' 
exogeneity. 
To provide a understanding of the difference between the two methods, we consider 
the fo llowing VAR mode! with exogenous variables : 
1) q 
Yi:= ao + :z:::: /3iYt-i + :z:::: ŒjXt-j + ul (2.1) 
i=l j=l 
where Xt is a vector of exogenous variables , with the crucial condition being that 
Next, assuming a VAR presentation fo r X 1 it elf, i.e. 
r 
X t = bo + I; Ài Xt-i + Yt , with E(Vtl{Yi:-i}~1 , {Xt-j }j=l) = O. (2. 2) 
i= l 
Assuming that r = q = p, the mode! reduces to a VAR(p) representation 
(iJ (::) + ( : : :: ) (ij + ... + ( :: :: ) (i,:) + (i,) (2.3) 
with the assumption that error are i.i.d normally distributed 
( Ut ) -i.i.d N[ (O) , ( ~11 ~12 ) ]. Vi O " " u21 u22 
20Indeed, exogeneiLy, predeterminaLion and causaliLy are Lhree quiLe diITerent Lhings. TesLs for causa-
lity can be used to refute or not refute strict exogeneity but not to establish it. 
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Here we impose a restriction whereby µ i = 0, for i = 1, ... , p, implying that Yi. does 
not appear in the X t equation or say Yi does not Granger-cause Xt, which is a weak form 
of exogeneity. Strong exogeneity requires in addit ion to weak exogeneity that ~ 12 = 0 
and thus ~12 = ~21 = O. In other words, this means t hat the error vectors Ut and Vt 
are independent. Tes ting for weak exogeneity is thus t he first steep along the way. The 
null hypothesis is then given by Ho : µ 1 = µ 2 = ... = µ1' = O. We then int roduce the 
following variance-covariance matrix 
(2.4) 
and test t he null hypothesis for strong exogeneity, as given below 
Ho: L 21 = 0, 
which completes the st andard approach to testing for exogeneity. 
The alternative is to use Leeper 's (1997) method , whereby a logit equation is estima-
ted for the dummy financial crisis , in order to check for exogeneity. Let X t represent the 
list of independent macro variables. The expectation of the dummy financial varia ble 
(Dt), condit ional on the information set S1/ 1 is then 
(2.5) 
where F (.) is the logistic fonction, {J( L ) = {3 1(L) + {32 (L2 ) + ... + /3m( Lm), Li the lag 
operator and T/ includes the constant and the t ime trend. 
The methodology is as follows . First , we estimate the logit equation inclucling ail 
macro variables for the financial dummy variable. Then, we compute the probabilities 
that the logit equation has t he value one at the dates selected by Mishkin and White 
(2002). 
21 T he t ime t informat ion set includes variables dated t-1 and earl ier. 
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The logit equation being considered here includes three lagged values for the inde-
pendent variable and a con tant , a time trend , as well as seasonal dummy variables as 
dependent variables . Table 2.7 displays the coeffi cients estimated using t he logit equa-
t ion. This equation appears to be imprecisely estimated and none of the individual 
coefficients is significant (except for some seasonal dummy variables), even at the ten 
percent significance level. 22 Table 2.8 show t he probabili ty predict ed by the logit equa-
t ion , and F igure 2.2 plots the predicted value against the actual value for the dummy 
variable. 
The conditional expectat ion for th last financial crisi · (2000M04) i · puzzling. Th 
predicted probability for thi event is 81.77%, implying that the financial cra h, which 
is believed to be unexpected , was predictable from the data. This result has to be t aken 
wit h precaution,23 given that the logit equation is impreci ely est ima ted and the value 
of parameters might affect the predicted probability. We therefore conclude tha t the 
logit approach doe not help in providing eviclence about the financial crisis variable's 
exogenei ty. 24 
Following Leeper (1997) , an alternative approach is to consider two linear systems25 
in which the dummy variable is entered in the VAR as an enclogenous variable, and then 
identify the shocks to financial cr isis by the Cholesky decomposition. For the fir t VAR 
(VARFl ), the financial dummy is ordered first , outpu t is orclerecl econd , followed by 
price, interest rate (R3 and Rlü), price of commodi t i s and finally total reserves plus 
a const ant , with a time trend and seasonal variable being clet erministic variables. It is 
assumed here t hat t he shock to the financial dummy may have contemporaneous effects 
22Including more t han 3 lagged values fo r the macro variable leads to non-convergence even when t he 
seasona l variables are not included in the logit estimation. Simila rly, Leeper (1997) includes 18 lags fo r 
the endogenous variables when esti mating t he VAR, but only 6 lags when est imat ing t he logit equation. 
23 Con idering two lags in t he logit equation decreases t he condi t ional expectation fo r t he last fin ancial 
crisis (2000M04) to 13.09. 
24 I-Iorent (2002) presents t he same evidence about t his approach when study ing t he Ramey and 
Sha pi ro (1997) dummy variable. 
25 Leeper (1997) point ou t some potentia l problems with t he VAR systems including dummy variables 
as endogenou . Indeed, t he predicted value fo r t he dummy variable may lie outs ide t he [O, l ] in terval, and 
regard ing t he d ichotomous na ture of t he dummy, the relat ion between th is and other system variables 
may be not linear. In our empirical st udy, the predicted value fo r the fin ancia l cr isis d ummy variable, 
computed for t he financia l VAR, lies wi thin the [O, l ] interval. 
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on the other variables . However , shocks to macro variables do not have t he same effect 
on the financial dummy. This can suggest that the financial crises are independ nt of 
the current st ate of the economy. 
In the econd VAR (VARF2) , output is ordered first, price is ordered second , followed 
by the price of commodities and total reserves, then the financial dummy i , ordered 
fifth and the interes t rates (R3 and RlO) are ordered last . The assumption behind this 
ordering is that shocks t o output, price, price of commodi t ies and total reserves have 
a contemporaneous effect on shock to the financial cri is variable. The shocks to the 
dummy variable have contemporaneous effects only on interest rate innovations. 
As highlighted by Horent (2002) in analyzing the Ramey and Shapiro (1997) dummy 
variable, it is diffi.cul t to justify the last assumption. Indeed, assuming that shocks to 
the financial dummy have contemporaneous effects on some macro variables and not 
on others is a strong assumption. However , if the dummy variable i truly exogenous, 
the impulse response f1mctions (IRF) computed using the VAR in whi ch the dummy 
variable is endogenous should not be affected by the ordering of innovations in the 
Choie ky decomposition. 
Figure 2.3 shows the impulse response functions (IRFs) computed from VARFl 
and VARF2. IRFs are then plotted for output, price, interest rates R3 and RlO , price 
of commodities and total reserves for shocks to the financial crisis variable, with the 
Cholesky decomposition. The solid lines display the IRFs when VARFl is estirnated 
and the dashecl lines the impulses for the VARF2. The 6 % confidence interval are 
computecl u ing 2500 replications of the Monte Carlo experiment , using the VARFl. 
All t he IRF computed for bat h VARs lie within the confidence intervals from the 
financial VAR, and the IRFs from VARFl and VARF2 exhibi t very similar pat terns. 
Even though the ordering in the Cholesky clecomposition cloes not affect the IRFs 
computed , overall the point estimat es of the IRFs computed for VARFl a re close to the 
corresponding point estimate reportecl for VARF2. 
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The two linear systems are estimated following the methodology used in Leeper 
(1997) to examine the exogeneity of the financial crisis dummy variable, where this 
dummy is entered as an endogenous variable, using the Cholesky decomposition with 
different ordering for each VAR, and then computing IRFs. This suggests that the 
financial collapses are exogenous,26 and thus we can conclude that the results reported 
for t he linear systems ar consistent with the fact that the financial cri is episodes are 
exogenous. 
The standard method is u ed to te t the exogeneity of the monetary policy shock. · 
Table 2.10 presents t he results on Granger causality test, showing that apart from the 
interest rates (R3 and RlO) and total reserves (TR) , we cannot reject the nul! hypothesis 
of the no causali ty. According to Granger, at the 5% significance level causality in 
the Granger sense cannot be established between the other macro variables and the 
monetary shock. 
As was mentioned in Subsection 2.3 .1 , we estimate two VARs in order to test for weak 
exogeneity. In this mode! we impose the restriction that the macroeconomic variables 
do not appear in the monetary shock equation, so that all the coefficients µi are equal 
to zero .27 We then compute the LR statistic and the results shown in Table 2.9 show 
that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level (not ven at the 
1 % ) . In this case the monetary policy measure would be weakly exogenous. 
Furthermore, using the Cholesky decomposit ion we conclude that the new monetary 
policy shock measure is exogenous, even when including more macro variables than tho e 
used by Romer and Romer (2004)28 to asse s this view. Indeed for the two VARs, Figure 
2.4 shows the IRFs for output , price, intere t rates R3 and RlO, price of commodities, 
and total reserves. In the first one (VARMl , a solid line in Figure 2.4) , t he monetary 
26 As mentioned by !:forent (2002), in trod ucing a logit equat ion in a linear system and replac ing t he 
linear equat ion for a dummy variable leads to a lack of significance for t he results retr ieved from the 
non-l inear system. The resul ts of this substitution are not pre ented here. 
27111 the monetary shock equat ion (in t he re tricted VAR) only this variable's lags are entered as 
ex planatory var iables, a long with constant term , t ime trend and seasonaJ var iables. 
28The specification used by the authors includes industr ia l production , t he PPI for finished goods and 
the new monetary policy measure. 
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policy shock is ordered firs t , followed by the macro variables . These suggest indepen-
dence between monetary policy measures and the current state of nature innovations 
on macro variables. 
In the second VAR (VARM2, long dashed lines in Figure 2. 4), output is ordered first 
for the Cholesky decomposition , and then prices, commodity prices, t ot al reserves, the 
monet ary shock, and finally the interest rates R3 and RlO. The same assumpt ions used 
for the financial crisis are applied here. Then the innovations to outpu t, price, com-
modities and to tal reserves have a contemporaneous effect on innovations to monetary 
policy, but the monetary shock have contemporaneous effects only on interest rate 
innovations. 
The IRF for output (in Figure 2.4) computed for VARM2 lies slightly above the 
68% confidence interval from monetary VAR29 (VARMl ) for 8 periods. Then it lies very 
slightly below the lower bound for the next 18 periods af'ter the shock. After that it lie 
within the confidence interval. The IRF for consumer prices lies below the confidence 
interval after 19 months. 
The response of R3 computed for VARM2 lies above t he upper bound fo r 7 months 
and then lies within the confidence interval until period 16, and then it lies within the 
confidence interval. The some response is di played by RIO . The IRF for P C and TR 
lies lightly below the confidence interval for almost all periods. 
However , the point estimates of the IRFs computed fo r the second linear syst em are 
close to t he corresponding point estimates reported for the first linear system and the 
patterns for the two VARs (with different Cholesky ordering) are quite similar to each 
other for all variables . 
Overall , the IRFs reported for the monetary policy shock are consistent wit h t he new 
monet ary measure being exogenous. Thus, as mentioned by Ramer and Ramer (2004) , 
the monet ary policy shock is relatively free of both the endogenous and ant icipatory 
29 2500 Monte Carlo replications of VARMl are used to compu te the 68% confid ence in terval. 
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actions of the monetary authorities. 
2.3 .2 Impulse Response Functions 
The implications of financial crisis shocks and monetary policy measures in VAR 
systems, and the isolation of macroeconomic effec ts of both shocks pas through the 
impul e response fonctions (IRFs) analysis. Thi process focuses on financial and mo-
netary VAR system estimation and then the IRFs -showing the effects of a unit shock 
to each variable of interest on macro variables- are computed. 
Results from financial VAR e timates are shown in Figure 2 .5. The responses to a 
uni t shock on financial crisi innovations are plot ted, along wi th their standard error 
bounds, computed using 2500 Monte Carlo replications using financial VAR. The output 
respon e is characterized by a decline, reaching its maximum (-5.8%) at month 16 after 
the bock and then returning toits initial level. This response is similar to that found by 
Leeper (1997), Sims (1980), Litterman and Weiss (1985) and others regarding the impact 
of monetary policy contractions on production. They argue that there is evidence that 
these perturbation can reduce nominal aggregate demand and lower output when prices 
adjust sluggi hly (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992). However, there is only one direct link 
between stock market collapses and monetary policy through the financial instability 
as pointed out in fi shkin (1997) and not ail crashes are follow cl by signs of financial 
instability (Mishkin and White, 2002 ). 
The impulse r ·ponse to consumer price impli cl by the financial VAR is ·mali 
and insignificant for the first 10 months, and then b cornes more significant, although 
modestly positive. The responses to interest rates are negative for a lmost all periods. The 
Treasury Bill rate (R3) rises for the 3 first period , falls rapidly to reach its maximum 
decline (-2.2 point ) at month 25 and then returns slowly toits initial value. The response 
to the 1\-easury bond yield (RlO) is negative with a maximum effect of -1.3 points at 
period 24. The IRF for commodity prices rises by 55% for the first 2 months and 
then begin to fall, reaching its maximum decline (-2%) at month 8 and then becoming 
52 
positive after period 10. After period 12 the IRF for total reserves shows a small positive 
value but a consistent response. 
P lotted in Figure 2.6 are macro variable responses to a unit shock to the monetary 
policy variable. Solid lines show point estimates and bort dashed lines are standard 
error bands, computed with 2500 Monte Carlo experiment replications using monetary 
VAR. 
The output response increases for three periods then it falls. The maximum decline 
is about 3.5%, and is attained at month 15, and then it returns back to its initial level. 
Romer and Romer (2004) found that the output response has its peak effect at about 
-2.9%, relatively the same thing a we get here. However, the inclusion of more macro 
variables leads to a change in the output response fonction , increasing to a po itive 
value through month 37 after the shock. Output returns to its initi al value, as in the 
Romer study. 
The response of consumer prices is similar to that reported in the Romer study. 
Indeed, the IRF of price is small , irregular for 12 periods and then negative. Th IRF 
computed for interest rates responding to a unit shock for the monetary policy variable 
are quite standard. They are positive for the fir t 12 periods , they reach 1 point at a 
maximum increase for R3 , and after that become negative. The IRF for RlO is similar 
to the R3 response for the 14 first periods, then they become negative and fairly fiat. 
The commodity prices show an irregular response until period 22 when they become 
negative, white reserves rise for the fir t 2 periods, then become negativ and irregular 
until month 23, and finally fall sharply to become negative and lowly return toward 
their initial level. 
Figure 2.7 shows impulse responses to a one unit shock to the innovations of a 
financial dummy variable when treated as exogenous in estimating a financial VAR. 
The responses are generally similar to those reported for the VAR when the dummy 
variable is treated as enclogenous, apart from the magnitudes which are more important 
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when financial collap es are estima ted exogenously in the VAR sys tem. 
The same conclusion applies when the monetary policy variable is treated as exoge-
nous. F igure 2.8 di plays the IRFs for t he variables in the monetary VAR. The respon es 
are relatively similar to those reported early (Figure 2.6) , confirming the view that both 
of these variables (monetary policy and stock market crisis clummy) are exogenous. 
In conclusion , the effect of monetary policy and stock market crisis variables on real 
economic activity is extensive and statistically significant . About the sam re ul t are 
obtained at Romer and Romer (2004) in their VAR analysis, including only 3 macro 
variables.30 This is somehow consistent with the idea t hat monetary policy shock has a 
temporary negative and persistent effect on output , as implied by the impulse respon es 
of structural VAR system .31 
The hump-shaped short-run output dynamics following monet ary policy contrac-
tions and stock market collapses suggest that both shocks have real effects on economic 
activity. As such, monetary authorities have to t ake these fact s into account when de-
veloping an optimal policy. 
2.3.3 Extended Madel 
The monetary policy and th fin ancial cri sis episocles may be characterized not only 
by a hock to monetary policy or financial sector collapse, but also by non- ystematic 
changes in other sectors of the economy, say by other exogenous shock . We therefore 
examine the effects that other shocks may have on the results reported for the two main 
shock considered here (monetary and financial crisis shocks). 
The mode! constructed includes Hamilton 's oil price shocks .32 Using the dates iden-
30T he Romers basic VAR include only output , price and t he monetary policy measure as endogenous 
variables. 
3 1 See Bernanke and B li nder (1992), Sims (1992) , Strongin (1995), Bernanke and l\1Iihov (1998), Ba-
glia no and Favero (1998) , and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999). 
32 The Ramey and Shapiro (1997) cl ummy variable i not includecl in t he sy tem because of data 
li mitation (the Romer's monetary measure begin 19691\IIOl ) . Indeed, the Korean War which was known 
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tified by Hamilton (1983), updated by Hoover and Perez (1994) and also Ramey and 
Shapiro (1997) , we construct a dummy variable that has the value one at the shock 
dates : 1969M01, 1970IvI04 , 1974M01, 1979M03, 1981M01 and 1990M03, and takes the 
value zero otherwise. 
The VAR constructed includes the macro variables and three shocks (monetary, 
financial crisis and oil price shocks). Optimal lag length and an adequate time trend 
are also included . Thus, to examine the effects that xogenous ·hocks may have on 
the results reported for shocks to the financial cri i variable, a VAR including these 
perturbations as exogenous variables is estimated. 
Figure 2.9 shows point estimates of responses for output, consumer prices, interest 
rates (R3 and Rlü), commodity prices and total reserves. The solid lines display point 
estimates for the IRFs and dashed lines display the 68% confidence interval. 
The IRF presented when other exogenous shocks are included to e timate the finan-
cial VAR indicate that results reported for price, interest rates and relative commodity 
prices are not very affected. The output response falls persistently and then becomes 
fi at, reaching -1 2% declines 3 years after the shock. The IRF for total reserves is negative 
for a whole period . 
Additionally, estimating a financial VAR with only two shocks, say the Hamil ton oil 
price dummy and the financial crisis variable, suggests that macro variable· responses 
remain relatively unchanged. Indeed, Figure 2.10 show that the output responses are 
the same as in the standard financial VAR until month 27, when it became in ignificant. 
The price IRF is weakly negative, and then significantly positive through period 32. The 
responses for the other variables are relatively the same as in standard financial VAR. 
Furthermore, the magnitude of the effect of a shock to financia l crisis is ignificantly 
similar to that reported for the standard financial VAR, and the pattern of the ffect 
is very similar. Thus, it does not appear that the inclusion of other exogenou bocks 
to have important effects on macro variables cannot be in cluded in our sample period. Th i loss of 
information can sign ificant ly affect the results obtained. 
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substantially alters the results reported earlier. Figure 2.11 shows evidence of the effect 
of the Ramer monetary policy variable in a mode! that alternatively includes financial 
crisis and oil price bock a exogenou variables. The IRF computed for output , price, 
interest rates, commodity prices and reserves are response to a one unit shock on 
monetary policy variable. The solid lines display the point estimate and dashed lines 
display the 68% confidence interval. Figure 2.12 show the IRF from monetary VAR, 
including only the Hamilton oi l price dummy, which was used in order to isolate the 
effects of th is variable on the responses given by the monetary policy variable. Ali the 
IRFs computed for the monetary system including other exogenou shock are relatively 
similar to those reported earlier for the standard monetary VAR, apart from the total 
reserves variable (for the system including all shocks), which becomes negative for a 
whole period. Thus it appears that this last variable is affected by the inclusion of 
all hocks in VAR estimates. Therefore, it is concluded t hat the results reported for 
the monetary policy system variable are not ensit ive to the addition of other shocks, 
confirming the view that thi. · hock i exogenou . 
Furthermore, to investigate the impact of the size given to the financial cri is epi-
sodes, we construct a weighted financial variable to which we assign a different weight 
to each crash , following the classification given by 1ishkin and White (2002). Indeed, 
the authors place them into four categories depending on whether or not the episodes 
appear to place ( or not) stress on the financial system.33 F igure 2.13 shows the IRFs 
computed for output, price, interest rates , commodity prices and reserves as responses 
to a one unit shock on a weighted financial variable. The patterns for the IRFs are re-
latively the same, thus it does not appear that the size attributed to financial epi odes 
alters results reported early in any subst antial way. 
33T he classification is as fo llows : 
- Category 1 : episodes 1962 and 2000 (weight = 1), 
- Category 2 : episode 1987 (weight = 2), 
- Category 3 : episode 1974 (weight = 4), 
- Category 4 : episode 1969-70 and 1990 (weight = 3) . 
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2 .4 Con cl us ion 
Many previous studies on the effect of monetary policy shocks on macroeconomic 
aggregates have used alternative methocls of identifying these policy shocks and have em-
ployed clifferent VAR systems and sample periods in their analyses. Moreover , recently 
there has been considerable discussion regarding the appropriate monetary policy se-
lected cluring the aftermath of a financial crisis . This suggest that there is a relation 
between monetary policy and financial stability, but there is still no clear consensus on 
how one affects the other . As pointed out in Mishkin and White (2002) , the key problem 
facing monetary policymakers is not stock market crashes , but rather financial instabi-
lity. Indeed, not all stock market collapses are associated with financial instability, for 
they also arise from other sources such as a banking system crisis. 
In this chapter we study the new monetary policy measure constructed by Romer 
and Romer (2004) in combination with a stock market crash measure based on dates 
highlighted by Mishkin and White (2002) , in order to test whether these shocks are 
exogenous. The impulse response fonctions for the monetary and financial model reveal 
that monetary policy and financial shocks considered in this study have significant effects 
respectively on output , price level and on other variables. 
Our results also show t hat even when including more macro variables than those 
used by Romers' study, we found t he new measure to be exogenous. Then , by applying 
the statistical methoclology used by Leeper (1997), we conclude that both shocks are 
truly exogenous. This suggests that the central bank has to take the effects of financial 
collapses into account when conducting monetary policy, even when targeting price 
tability. The link between both targets is unclear to some extent , and more research in 
this direction has to be conducted. 
Tab. 2.1: AIC a nd SIC fo r T ime Trend in Financia l VAR 
Financial VAR (1960M01-2000M l 2) 
Type of Trend Akaike Cri terion Schwarz Criterion 
No time trend 
Linear time trend 
Linear and quadratic time trend 
** indicates selection of t he criterion. 
-28.07880 -26.94209 
-28.13752 -26.94098 
-28.21531 ** -26.95894** 
Tab. 2.2: AIC and SIC for Time Trend in Moneta ry VAR 
lonetary VAR (1969M01-1996M l 2) 
Type of Trend Akaike Cri terion Schwarz Cri terion 
No time trend 
Linear time trend 
Linear and quadratic time trend 
** indicat es selection of the criterion. 
-26.09796 -24.58702** 
-26 .14461 -24.55414 
-26.17300** -24.50302 
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Ta b. 2. 5 : AIC Values for Various Lag Lengths and TI:end Specifications (FV) 
Finan ial VAR (1960M01-2000Ml2) 
Number of lag I No t rend I Linear trend I Linear and quadratic trend 
0 0.001422 -7.406757 -8.871593 
1 -28.01935 -28.07865 -28.16509 
2 -28.35311 -28.37954 -28.44960 
3 -28.46500 -28.50133 -28.55322 
4 -28 .44977 -28.48635 -28.55049 
5 -28.48763 -28.52532 -28 .58268 
6 -28.48231 -28.51173 -28.56402 
7 -28.51179 -28.56804 -28.60942 
8 -28.60547 -28.67460 -28. 70526** 
** indicates sel ction of the criterion. 
Ta b. 2.6: AIC Values for Various Lag Lengths and TI·end Specifications (MV) 
l'vlonetary VAR (1969M01-1996M12) 
Number of lag I No trend I Linear trend I Linear and quaclratic trend 
0 0.001422 -7.406757 -8.871593 
1 -28 .01935 -28.07865 -28.16509 
2 -28 .35311 -28.37954 -28.44960 
3 -28.46500 -28.50133 -28.55322 
4 -28.44977 -28 .48635 -28 .55049 
5 -28.48763 -28 .52532 -28.58268 
6 -28.48231 -28.51173 -28.56402 
7 -28.51179 -28.56804 -28.60942 
8 -28 .60547 -28.67460 -28 . 70526** 
** indicates selection of the criterion. 
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Tab. 2 . 7: Estimat ion Results for Logit Equation 
(Data: 1960M05-2000Ml2) 
Variables I Coefficients Estimate I Standard Error I T-Statistic 
Constant 8.94 198.96 0.04494 
CRJSIS{l} -28.45 117.63 -2.42533e-06 
CRJSIS{2} -22.04 916.97 -2.40463e-06 
CRISI8{3} -26.81 104.67 -2.56014e-06 
Y{l} 24.75 72.86 0.33966 
Y{2} 151.48 134.47 1.12650 
Y{3} -181.72 103.62 -1.75373 
P{l} 387.46 347.54 1.11486 
P{2} 30.74 505.52 0.06081 
P{3} -401.77 393.09 -1.02208 
PC{l} -32.78 43 .86 -0 .74730 
PC{2} -19.32 71.39 -0.27057 
PC{3} 42.28 38.22 1.10627 
R3{1} -5.78 3.76 -1.53638 
R3{2} 6.79 4.49 1.51061 
R3{3} -1.58 2.33 -0.67912 
RlO{l} 6.91 4.26 1.62379 
Rl0{2} -11.32 7.00 -1.61837 
Rl0{3} 4.54 4.25 1.06788 
TR{l} 104.54 175.57 0.59543 
TR{2} -532.80 261.65 -2.03631 
TR{3} 417.46 180.61 2.31139 
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Tab. 2.8: Conditional Expectation Computed from the Logit Equation 
(Data : 1960l\lI01-2000Ml2) 
Date Epi odes I Predicted Probability (percent) 
1962M04 10.02 
1970M05 23.59 
1973Mll 51.55 
1987Ml0 11.52 
1990M08 2.57 
2000M04 81.77 
Tab. 2 .9: LR Test for Weak Exogeneity of Monetary Shock 
Joint Weak Exogeneity Test 
Value 
Log Likelihood For restricted VAR -786.4347 
Log Likelihood For unrestricted VAR 
-786.4344 
LR Statistic 0.0006 
Critical Value at 5% level (x2 (90) ) 113.l 
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Fig. 2-1: Romer and Romer (2004) 1 ew Measure of Monetary Policy Shocks 
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F ig . 2-3: Re ponscs to Un it Shock in Stock Market Crisis with Cholesky Decompo ·it.ions 
OUTPUT 
.04,------------------~ 
.02 
, .. -... -, 
.... - ... ' 1 
/ 
-.02 
- .04 
- .06 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 
TREASURY BILL RATE 
1-~-----------------~ 
-1 
-2 -
-3 
,// .. ---.......... ,,/ 
// 
. __ ,_/ / 
' ,:,.. --, ! ,--,.-,----/' 
\ /•,\_, .... '---',,,// 
~ .. _ ..--\ 
• .. ...,, __ / 
-4+-r--------~------~-..-i 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 
COMMODrfY PRICES 
.25,-------------------, 
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 
CONSUMER PRICES 
.04 ,------------------~ 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 
TREASURY BOU ND YIE LD 
0.5,------------------~ 
-0.5 
-1 .0 -
-1.5 
-2.0 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 
TOTAL RESERVES 
.03,------------------~ 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 
-- VAR F1 UPPER SOUND 
--- VAR F 2 -- 0 LINE 
--- --· LOWER BOUND 
66 
Fig. 2-4: Responses to l\1Ionetary Shock with Cholesky Decomposit ion 
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Fig . 2-5 : R . ponses to a Unit Shock on Stock Mark t Crisis Innovat ions 
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Fig. 2-6: Responses to a Uni t Shock on Monetary P olicy Innovations 
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Fig. 2-7: Re panses to a Un it Shock on Stock Market Crisis Dummy (D ummy Variable Treated as 
Exogenous) 
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Fig. 2-8: Responses to a Uni t Shock on Monetary Policy Variable (Moneta ry Vari able Treated as 
Exogenous) 
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Fig. 2- 9: Responses to a Un it Shock on Stock Market Crisis Dummy (Financial VAR with Other 
Exogenous Shocks) 
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Fig . 2- 10: Responses to a Uni t Shock on Stock Market Cri is Dummy (F inancial VAR with Hami lton 
Oil Price Exogenous Shocks) 
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Fig. 2-11 : Re ponses to a Un it Shock on Monetary Policy Variable (Monetary VAR with Other Exo-
genous Shocks) 
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Fig. 2-12: Responses to a Unit Shock on Monctary Policy Variable (Monctary VAR with Ham ilton Oil 
Price Exogenous Shocks) 
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Fig. 2- 13: Respon es to a Unit Shock on Weighted Stock Market Grisi Variab le Innovation. (Extended 
F inancia l VAR) 
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CHAPITRE III 
HYBRID INFLATION-PRICE-LEVEL TARGETING IN 
SMALL-OPEN-ECONOMY NEW-KEYNESIAN FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Introduction 
Throughout the last decade inflation targeting has been widely adopted as a fra-
mework for monet ary policy. Indeed , several industrialized countries have formally or 
informally adopted inflation targeting (hereafter, IT) , and thus far most of them appear 
to be enjoying good inflation performance, 1 price stability and satisfact ory real growth 
records.2 
In contrast , 'conventional wisdom' has been skeptical of price-level targeting (he-
reafter , PT). The main argument against PT is that it induces both higher short-run 
inflation and also output variability than does IT (see Fischer, 1994, Haldane and Sal-
mon , 1995). However , Di ttmar et al. (1999) and Svensson (1999) argue that PT has 
some advantages over IT, since with PT inflat ion variabili ty becomes lower , assuming 
that output persistence is at least moderate. 3 The controversy mainly concerns the de-
finition of price st abili ty and more particularly how price stability can be maintained 
in practice. For instance, the monetary authorities should choose paths for either price 
1 A survey of li tera ture on the economic performance of inflation-targeting countries is presented in 
Svensson (1995) Haldane (1995) and Bernanke et al. (1999). 
2 Canada, Australia , New Zealand , Sweden, the Uni ted Kingdom (UK) and other industrialized coun-
tries adopted IT regime. 
3 Svensson (1999) and Vestin (2000) argue t hat price-level ta rgeting yields better output-inflation 
variabi li ty trade-off and price stabi li ty than does infla tion ta rget ing. 
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level or for the infla tion rate, allowing in the latter case for a base drift in price level. 4 
More recently, Nessen (2002) and Nessen and Vestin (2000) suggest that the central 
bank should target an average inflation over several periods. Batini and Yates (2003), 
Cecchetti and Kim (2003) and Kobayashi (2004) investigate another nove! proposal that 
combines IT and PT in a mixed regime, called hybrid inflation/ price-level targeting 
(hereafter , HT) . In this proposal inflation volatility becomes lower when compared to 
PT and IT regimes. Indeed, Batini and Yates (2003) introduce a new perspective on 
the analysis of price-level and inflation targets by considering a hybrid t arget, which 
is a weighted average of an inflation target and a price-level target. They did not, 
however, use a utility-based welfare loss function as an evaluation criterion. In t heir 
analysis of price-level versus inflation targeting under different mode! specifications, 
policy rules, and loss functions of the central bank, Batini and Yates (2003) find that 
the more forward-looking the mode!, the less noticeable the difference between the 
reaction functions of inflation and price- level targeting which make the performance of 
such rules highly dependent on the degree of forward- looking behavior. Using Fuhrer 
and Moore (1995) 's model to explore the implications of these regimes for the United 
Kingdom, Batini and Yates (2003) examine both a set of simple rules feed ing back from 
alternative combinations of price level and inflation deviations from target and a set of 
optimal control mies obtained under the assumption that policy makers minimize a Joss 
function which penalizes a rnixed price level/ inflation target.5 
Despite this thriving theoretical literature however , li ttle work bas been done to 
direct evaluate this kind of regime (HT) in open economy modeling cases . An analysis 
of HT in a small open economy environment is relevant , especially given IT and PT 
regime shortcomings, as well as the implications of this policy's weakness for central 
banks. We then attempt to investigate this targeting type in a small open economy 
4 The flrst known example of an im plicit target for price stabili ty was in terms of price level targeting, 
as adopted by Sweden in t he 1930s (see Berg and Jonung, 1999). 
5Batinj and Yates (2003) explored the implications of the HT regime using a reduced-form of t he 
Fuhrer and Moore (1995) mode! which is not built on microfoundations as compelling as t he Calvo mode!. 
Like the original Taylor mode!, the Fuhrer-Moore mode! is based on some arbitrary but superficially 
plausible assumptions about the form of tabor contracts (Mankiw, 2001 ). 
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model, calibrated to the salient features of th Canadian economy. 
Our work departs from the above mentioned literature in at least two dimensions 
along which we extend the work of Batini and Yates (2003) and Kobayashi (2004) . First , 
we consider the New-Keynesian framework rather than the New-Classical environment. 
Second , we apply welfare analysis to the hybrid monetary policy. We do discuss the 
potential of this features in detail la ter on in this chapter. 
The small open economy version implies that foreign variables may be includ d 
in each equation of the model, and that the treatment of foreign sector variables is 
different from that used for the closed-economy version. These differences may result 
in contrasting policy advice or may confirm results obtained in the literature for the 
HT regime. Moreover, analyzing the small open economy takes into consideration the 
possibility that international trade and financial assets would affect the evolution of 
the domestic economy. Thus, foreign shocks such as terms of trade can alter domestic 
busines cycle fluctuations, giving rise to many more dynamics within the mode!, which 
may lead the monetary authority to explicitly take these kinds of fluctuations into 
account (Lubik and Schorfheide, 2003). Further, the recent development in the New 
Open Economy Macroeconomics originated by Obst feld and Rogof (1995) leads to a 
wealth of literature in which micro- founded and optimization-based models are used for 
policy analysis in the open economy. 6 It highlights t he rol of the terms of trade in the 
transmission of business cycles (see Corsetti and Pesenti , 2001) . 
In line with previous research on monet ary policy analysis, we adopt the New-
Keynesian framework, a mode! t hat many macroeconomic studies have indeed frequently 
employed. 7 The most important feature of this mode! is the appearance of terms that 
reflect the forward-looking behavior of representa tive agents. This leads for example 
to a st abilization bias problem that occurs if monetary authorities apply discretionary 
monetary policy (Clarida et al., 2000). Most of the literature to date uses the new 
6See Lane (2001) fo r a survey. 
7See for example McCallu m and Nelson (2000) , Clarida et al. (2000) , Ba ll (1999) and Svensson (2000) 
for a discussion of t hese kinds of models. 
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classical model to assess the property of the HT regime and confi rms its advantages 
(Kobayashi , 2004) . However , the use of New-Keynesian models in analyzing the HT 
regime is only in its first stages.8 In this chapter we attempt t o investigate this framework 
and try to provide evidence that will assist in discriminating between hybrid regimes 
and other kinds of monetary policy targeting. 
Galf and Monacelli (2004)9 consider a smalt open economy version of the Calvo st i-
cky price mod 1 and show how the equilibrium dynamics can be reduced to a simple 
representation in domestic inflation and output gap. The model used here fu rther ex-
plores this avenue and extends Galf and Monacelli's (2004) framework to account for 
HT t argeting. We use the resulting setting to analyze the macroeconomic implications 
of three alternative rule-based policy regimes for the small open economy : CPI-inflation 
based Taylor ru le, price level based Taylor rule, and a hybrid inflation/ price level based 
rule. 
In our empirical work,10 we use the New Keynesian framework in a calibrated DSGE 
model, applying the hybrid monet ary policy rule. We calibrate key parameters to mat ch 
some broad characteristics of the Canadian data. Since analyt ical solutions are often 
not available for this regime and empirical literature has not reached a consensus about 
key parameters, we must then rely on a calibrated model. Subsequently, we conduct a 
welfare analysis between the various monetary policy regimes considered in this study 
and compare their impulse response fonct ions. 
8Dit tmar et al. (1999) Cecchetti and Kim (2003) and Kobaya.shi (2004) ana lyzed the Hybrid regime 
using a mode! simila r to Svensson's (1999) mode!. Bat ini and Yates (2003) explored t he im plications of 
t his regime using t he Fuhrer and Moore (1995) mode!. 
9T he authors develop a t ractable opt imizing mode! of a small open economy with staggered price 
setting à la Calvo to analyze three interest rate ru le : domestic infla tion-based Tay lor ru le, CPI-ba.sed 
Taylor ru le, and an exchange rate peg. 
10Different a pproaches have been adopted by macroeconomists in analyzing DSGE models. Sorne stan-
dard procedures are appEed to est imate DSGE models using Maximum Likeli hood (ML), Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM), Simu lated Method of Moments (SMM), t he Indirect Inference procedure 
proposed by Smit h (1993) and fina lly the Bayesian techniques. Most of t hese modeling techniques have 
to deal wi th potent ia l mode! misspecificat ion and ident ification problems. Ta king t he misspeci fi cation 
of those models into consideration, many aut hors use t he calibration approach . Along the lines of that 
used by Kydland and Prescott (1982) , t his approach is by far the most common approach found in t he 
li terature for examining the empirical propert ies of DSGE models (An and Schorfheide, 2005). 
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Our results are consistent with the fact that hybrid inflation / price-level targeting 
performs well and provides an alterna tive method for conducting successfu l monetary 
policy in the case of a small open economy, without having to worry about the short-
comings of the other monetary policy regimes considered in this work. This is more 
likely to be the case if the small open economy considered in this work follows monetary 
policies that allow for some temporary base drift in prices (HT targeting) . 
The chapter proceeds in the following manner. Section 3.2 sket ches the model's 
derivation as implied by the microfoundations presented by Galf and Monacelli (2004). 
Section 3.3 provides det ails on the quantitative methodology and discusses the results. 
Section 3.4 introduces welfare analysis and provides some results. S ction 3.5 presents 
the concluding remarks. 
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3.2 The Model 
We construct a model that is a variant of a dynamic New-Keynesian model applied to 
the small open economy, following Clarida et al. (2002) and Galf and Monacelli (2004). 
The mode! has three ectors : 1) a continuum of profit maximizing monopolistically 
competitive firms (owned by consumers who include its shares in their portfolios) ope-
rating a constant returns to scale technology and making staggered price decisions in 
the spirit of Calvo (1983); 2) an infinitely-lived representative hou ehold maximizes a 
utility function defined over a composite consumption good and labor supply; 3) a cen-
tral bank sets the monetary policy through an interest rule that targets both the price 
level and the inflation rate in a hybrid formula . 
3.2.1 Firms' Problem 
The production function for a typical home economy fi.nu i that produces a diffe-
rentiated good is as follows : 
(3.1) 
al! i E [O, l], Yt(i) and Nt(i) are the firm i 's specific output and labor input, respectively. 
At is a total factor productivity term that follows an AR(l) process (in log deviation) , 
i.e. 
where t:a ,t i a white noise with mean O and variance J;. 
The cost minimization problem leads to express real marginal cost ~Ct -which is 
common across domestic fi.rms , in terms of home prices : 
/\ A A A 
1nCt = -v + Wt - PH,t - at, (3.2) 
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where v = - log(l - T), T is an employment subsidy, 11 PH,t and Ûlt stand for the 
deviations of domestic price and wage rate from their steady state values, respectively. 
Let Yi. define the aggregate index for domestic output and Nt the aggregate employ-
ment. Yi. and Nt can be expressed in terms of an individual firm 's output as follows 
r1 ~ _L Yi. = [}
0 
Yi. ( i) { di] {-1, 
N - 1 1N(") d·- 1 1Yi.(i) d. t - t i i - -A i, 
0 0 t 
where ç > 1 i the elasticity of substitution among goods within each category. Moreover, 
defining Zt = f01 Y~t) di yields 
N _ Yi.Zt t - At . 
In loglinear form (up to a first order approximation) aggregate output reduces to 
(3.3) 
where the variables Yt, ât and fit represent the deviations of output, total factor produc-
tivity and employment from a symmetric steady state. 
Price Setting 
Price setting behavior fo llows Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996) in that only a fraction 
(1 - 'lf;) of firms adjust their price each period, while a fraction 'l/J of randomly selected 
firms keep their price unchanged. This leads to a forward-looking pricing decision. 
We follow Galf and Monacelli (2004) to determine the new price-setting strategy.12 
Let Pfi,t be the price set by a firm i adjusting its price in period t and facing a probability 
11 The employment subsidy exactly offsets the combined effects of the fi rm 's market power and the 
terms of t rade distortions in the steady state. In th is case there is only one effective distortion left in 
the small open economy mode!, namely sticky prices. 
12See Appendix 2 in Galf and Monacell i (2004) for more detai ls . 
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'lj; k of keeping its price unchanged for k periods (for k=0 ,1,2, .. . ) . The new price must 
satisfy t he following equation 
00 
PJ},t = µ, + (1 - IN) L,UNl Et{mCt.+k + PH,t+d , 
k=O 
(3.4) 
where µ, is the steady state markup. 13 The dynamic of the domestic price index is then 
given by 
(3 .5) 
which can b e loglinearized to obtain an expression for the domestic infl ation as follows 
1fH,l = (1- '!f; )(PH,t - PH,t-1). (3.6) 
Combining (3.6) with the differentia ted version of (3.5) yields the following aggregate 
supply equa tion 
(3.7) 
where "' = (1 - (N) (1 - 'if;) /'If; and ri,,Ct represents t he log-deviat ion of the real marginal 
cost. 
Under the assumption t hat the degree of price stickiness is identical across economies 
(small open economy and the rest of the world) , t he firms in the rest of the world (ROW) 
face the sam e price setting problem. 
13The forward- looking pricing decision is related to the fact that fi rms t hat adjusi their price in any 
period do so for a random number of periods. T he price is then set as a markup over t he average of 
expected fu t ure margina l costs. 
84 
3.2.2 Households 
Our small open economy is inhabited by a continuum of infinitely-lived households 
where the representative household seeks to maximize the following expected utility 
00 
Et ~ /iU(Ct, Nt) , (3.8) 
t= O 
where Nt is hours worked and Ct is a composite consumption index defined by 
1 0 - 1 l 0 - 1 0 
Ct = [(1- a)iî(CH,t)---r + aiî (CF,t)-o Jo-1. (3.9) 
The elasticity of substitution between the indices of home and foreign goods is given by 
B > O. CH,t is the consumption index of j domestic goods defined by the CES aggregator 
Likewise, CF,t is the index of imported goods given by 
where the elasticity of substitution among goods within the two indices ( is greater than 
one. 
Maximization of the expected ut ility is subject to the sequence of budget constraints 
of the form 
where PH,t(j) is the price of the domestic good j and PF,t(j) is the price of imported 
good j expressed in home currency. Dt+l is the nominal payoff in period t + 1 of the 
portfolio held at the end of period t (including firms' share), Wt is the nominal wage 
rate and Tt is lump-sum transfers/taxes. Ot,t+l is the stochastic discount factor for 
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one-period-ahead nominal payoffs relevant to the domestic hou ehold. 
It can be shown that the demand functions for the domestic and foreign goods satisfy 
C ( ") = ( PH,tU) )-ç C H,t J p H,t, H,t (3. 11) 
C ( .) = ( PF,t(j))_ç C . F,t J p F,t F,t (3.12) 
Note that the above functions define the quantities consumed for each type of good, 
where PH,t and PF,t are the domestic and foreign price indices expressed in domestic 
currency. PH,t and PF,t are then given by the following expressions 
(3.13) 
(3.14) 
Combining (3.11)-(3.14) to obtain 
Similarly, it can be show that the optimal allocations between domestic and imported 
goods are given by the following relations 
C ( PF,t) - oC F,t = a Pi t · 
86 
The consumer price index is then, 
the following loglinearized form obtains 
Pt = (1 - a) PH,t + a PF,t· 
We can then compute the total consumption expenditures by domestic households 
as follows 
Substituting (3 .15) back into (3.10) yields 
V>le then introduce the following functional form for the utility fonction : 
ci-a Nl+<I> 
U(Ct, Nt)= -- - --. 
1-a l+ ef> 
The Lagrangian expression for this problem is then given by 
The intratemporal optimality condition follows from the household problem 
C aN<I> - vVi t t - . Pt 
(3.15) 
(3.16) 
(3.18) 
On the other hand , intertemporal optimization (for all states and dates) implies the 
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following Euler equation with regards to consumption 
O = JJ(ct+ l )- u(_!i_) 
t,t+1 C n · 
t r t+l 
(3.19) 
Let R t = 1/ EtOt,t+l define the gross return on the riskless period discount bond 
paying off one unit of domestic currency in t+ 1. Equation (3.19) can easily be rewritten 
as a standard Euler equation 
(3.20) 
which in loglineari zed form yields, 
where p = - log J3 is the time discount factor. 
In the rest of the world a representative household faces a problem similar to the 
one outlined above. Vve assume here that relative to the ROW economy the size of the 
small open economy is negligi ble. 14 
Sorne Identities 
We assume that the law of one price holds for all goods (including imported goods) 
at al! times implying that 
PF,t(j) = f.tPft(j) for al! j E [0 , 1], (3 .21) 
where f.t is the bilateral nominal exchange rate, 15 Pt:,t(j) is the price of the good (j) 
produced in a foreign country in terms of the foreign currency. 
14 This assumpt ion a llows us to treat the ROW economy as a closed economy. 
15The price of fo reign country currency in terms of domest ic currency. 
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Subst ituting (3. 14) into (3.21) yields the following expression for the foreign price 
index 
Similarly, if we define the foreign price index as 
we can wri te the relat ion between the home price of imported goods and the foreign 
price index in loglinearized form around a steady sta te as 
(3.22) 
In addition, using t he term of trade definition St = EtPt / PH,t , and loglinearizing 
around a symmetric steady state , yields 
(3.23) 
Since by definition the real exchange rate (in loglinearized form) is given by 
substituting into equation (3.23) yields the following rela tion between the real exchange 
rate and the terms of t rade given the price levels : 
qt = St + PH,t - Pt· (3.24) 
On the other hand, using the defini tion of the price indices it can be shown that 
P • P • [(l ) (S)1-e]-1 5 1- e • 
- Pt - - PH,t = - a + a 1 - 9 ast . 
PH PH 
(3 .25) 
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F'urthermore, assuming that purchasing power parity (PPP) holds in the steady 
state, i. e., 
Pp 
S=-=l PH ) (3.26) 
and combining (3.23), (3.25) and (3.26), we can write the relation between the domestic 
price level and the CPI as follows, 
Pt - PH,t = O:st- (3 .27) 
As a result , domestic inflation relates to CPI inflation according to 
(3.2 ) 
Substituting (3.27) back into (3.24) yields an expression for the real exchange rate 
as a fonction of terms of trade, i.e., 
éù = (1 - o:)st, (3.29) 
which establishes a relation between real exchange rate and terms of trade, depending 
on the degree of openness of the SOE. 
International Risk Sharing 
In our work we assume that there exists in the world a complete securities market 
so that the Euler equation would also hold for the foreign representative household , l6 
i.e. 
0 = /3E { (Ct+i)-u( Pt )(_:!_)} t,t+i t C* P* . 
t t+l Et+l 
(3.30) 
16In terms of domestic currency. 
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Hence, combining equation (3.30) with its domestic counterpart, substituting in 
Qt = EtPt / Pt and rearranging terms yields : 
(3.31) 
Finally, replacing Ct+1 and c;+l with their respective expression yields the optimal 
allocation for the imported good : 
(3.32) 
Therefore, the relation (3.31) can be rewritten as 
where <1? 0 depends on initial condition of the country's asset position. If we assume 
symmetric initial conditions between home and foreign country, with zero foreign asset 
holdings for the small open economy, without loss of generali ty we obtain <1? 0 = 1 so 
that the loglinearized form leads to 
Substituting (3 .29) back into (3 .33) then yields 
• '* 1 - a. 
Ct = Ci, + --St. 
(J 
which links both consumption variables to the tenus of trade. 
(3.33) 
(3.34) 
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Uncovered Interest Parity 
Under the assumption of complete securities markets , the previous Euler equation 
also holds for foreign households, i.e. 
or , put another way, 
R.;-1 =.BEt{(c;~1)-a( ~t )} . 
et Pi+1 
(3.35) 
Substituting (3.35) back into equation (3.30) yields the price of a riskless bond domi-
nated in foreign currency as 
(3.36) 
Since by definition }4- 1 = EtOt ,t+l, (3.36) implies that 
(3.37) 
The loglinearized form around the steady state gives the asset pricing equation for 
nominal bounds which implies that the interest rate differential is related to the expected 
exchange rate depreciation, 
(3.38) 
where êt is the deviation of the nominal exchange rate from its steady state value. 
3.2.3 Monetary Policy 
To close the model , we assume that the central bank sets the nominal interest rate 
following a Taylor-type interest-rate rule. However, money does not appear in either 
the household utility fonction or in the budget constraint. Indeed, recent research on 
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monetary policy adopts this modeling strategy (Galf and Monacelli, 2004). In this kind 
of model money plays the role of an account unit only. Moreover, the influential work by 
Taylor (1993) uses an interest rate feedback from output and inflation to approximate 
monetary policy. Recently Woodford (2000) demonstrated that the interest rate rule 
is consistent with nominal demand determinacy for forward-looking models even when 
money demand is not present in the model. In addition, in an open economy model the 
exchange rate is affected by the difference between domestic and foreign nominal interest 
rates and expected future exchange rates, via an interest pari ty condition (Svensson, 
1998) . Moreover , the real exchange rate will affect the relative prie between domestic 
and foreign goods, which in turn will affect both domestic and foreign demand for 
domestic goods, and hence contribute to movements in CPI infla tion. Likewise, the 
exchange rate affects the domestic currency prices of imported final goods, which are 
included in the CPI price. In this way, monetary policy can affect both the CPI price 
and CPI inflation rate. Consequently, analyzing our mode! we consider a monetary rule 
that incorporates both the price level and the inflation rate, although the historical rule 
is rather an inflation-based rule. 
As in Taylor (1993, 1996) and Batini and Yates (2003), we assume that the monetary 
policy follows the generalized Taylor rule of the form 
(3.39) 
where ft denotes the short-term nominal interest rate and irt , Pt are defined in the same 
way as above, and it is the outpu t gap. x E [O, 1) is the parameter that defines the 
spectrum of targets between price level and inflation targeting. When x = 0, the policy 
makers target the price level and when X= 1, the level of the inflation rate is targeted. 
For O < x < 1 the target is a hybrid regime targeting both price level and inflat ion rate 
level. 
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3.2.4 Equilibrium Determination 
Aggr egat e D em and 
World Output and Consumption 
Combining the market clearing condition for the ROW economy y; = ê;, along with 
the Euler equat ion for the foreign household 's consumption , 
leads to a version of the new IS equat ion in the case of sticky price models 
This IS equation shows t hat the foreign output is related negatively to the world 
interest rate and positively to the expected foreign CPI inflation. 
Small Open Economy Output , Consumption and Tracte Balance 
Market clearing for domestic goods requires that 
Yt (i) = CH,t (i ) + CH,t(i), 
where Yt(i), CH,t(i) and CH,t(i) are, respect ively, the product ion, home and foreign 
demand for home produced good i . Moreover based on preference symmetry between 
the home and the foreign country it can be shown that 
P ( ') p p F C* - (_!Y:_:_) -ç (__!!.L) -ç (_.!_1_ )-0c* H,t - a p pF P* t · H,t Et F,t t (3 .40) 
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Substituting (3.40) back into in the market clearing condition above, we get 
for all i E [O, 1] and for all t. 
Using the fact that St = Et Pftf PH,t the aggregate output can be shown to reduce 
to 
(3.41) 
Log-linearizing (3.41) while making use of PH,t - Pt = ŒSt yields 
Yt = êt + açst + a(B - 2-_ )<'ù-
u 
(3.42) 
Equation (3.42) states that the relation between output and consumption in terms of 
exchange rate and terms of trade variables, is governed by the economy's degree of 
openness. 
Furthermore, notice that using éit = (1- a)st the expression (3.42) can be rewritten 
as 
A A aw A 
Yt = Ct + -St, 
(J 
where w = çu + (uB - 1) (1 - a). Using the fact that 
equation (3.43) becomes 
A '* ( 1 - a) A Ct = Yt + -- St, 
(J 
A * 1 A 
Yt = Yt + - St 
(J Cl 
(3.43) 
(3.44) 
where CJa = u/[(l - a)+ aw] and the subscript in CJc, is meant to emphasize the 
dependence of this parameter on the degree of openness of the economy (a). Finally 
we can compute a version of the new IS equation for the SOE by combining the Euler 
9 5  
e q u a t i o n  ( 3 . 2 0 )  w i t h  ( 3 . 4 3 ) ,  w h i c h  y i e l d s  
Y t  =  E t  { f l t + i }  - ~ ( r ' \  - E t {  1 Î " t + i }  - p )  - a w  E t  {  S t + 1 } .  
a  a  
T h i s  l e a d s  t o  a  d i f f e r e n c e  e q u a t i o n  f o r  o u t p u t  w h i c h  i s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  d o m e s t i c  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e ,  w o r l d  o u t p u t  a n d  d o m e s t i c  i n f l a t i o n  
Y t  =  E t { Y t + d  - _ 2 : _ _ ( f t  - E t { 1 Î " t + d  - p )  +  a ( w  - l ) E t { t i . f ; ; + 1 } ·  
a ° '  
( 3 . 4 5 )  
T h i s  S O E  e q u a t i o n  i s  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  i t s  c l o s e d  e c o n o m y  v e r s i o n  b e c a u s e  i t  d e p e n d s  
o n  t h e  s m a l l  e c o n o m y ' s  d e g r e e  o f  o p e n n e s s  a n d  o n  f o r e i g n  o u t p u t
1 7
.  
M o r e o v e r ,  n e t  e x  p o r t s  (  n x )  a r e  r e l a t e d  t o  d o m e s t i c  o u t p u t  i n  t e r m s  o f  s t e a d y  s t a t e  
o u t p u t  ( Y )  t h r o u g h  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  e q u a t i o n  
1  P t  
n x t  =  ( - ) ( Y t  - - C t ) -
y  P H , t  
( 3 . 4 6 )  
C o m b i n i n g  t h e  l i n e a r i z e d  v e r s i o n  o f  ( 3 . 4 6 )  w i t h  ( 3 . 2 7 ) ,  ( 3 . 3 4 )  a n d  ( 3 . 4 3 )  y i e l d s  
r i ' x t  =  ( 1  - A ) ( f l t  - f ; ; )  
w h e r e  A =  a o , [ ( 1 - a )  + a a ] / a .  T h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  t h e  n e t  e x p o r t s  a n d  t h e  o u t p u t  
d i f f e r e n t i a l  i s  a m b i g u o u s  a n d  d e p e n d s  o n  t h e  v a l u e  o f  A .  I f  - 1  <  A  <  1 ,  a  p o s i t i v e  o u t p u t  
d i f f e r e n t i a l  g e n e r a t e s  a  t r a d e  s u r p l u s  f a v o r a b l e  t o  t h e  s m a l l  o p e n  e c o n o m y  a n d  w i t h  
A  >  1  o r  A  <  - 1  t h e  t r a d e  s u r p l u s  i s  f a v o r a b l e  t o  t h e  f o r e i g n  c o u n t r y .  F o l l o w i n g  G a l i  
a n d  M o n a c e l l i  ( 2 0 0 4 )  w e  n e e d  - 1  : S A  : S  1  t o  s a t i s f y  t h e  M a r s h a l l - L e r n e r  c o n d i t i o n s
1 8
.  
1 7
l t ' s  e a s y  t o  s e e  t h a t  w i t h  o ,  =  0 ,  w e  c a n  o b t a i n  t h e  c l o s e d  e c o n o m y  v e r s i o n .  
1 8
T h e  M a r s h a l l - L e r n e r  c o n d i t i o n s  a p p l y  i f  a n d  o n l y  i f  t h e  s u m  o f  t h e  i m p o r t  a n d  e x p o r t  e l a s t i c i t i e s  i s  
g r e a t e r  t h a n  o n e .  
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Deriving the New K eynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) 
Price stickiness is the main source of nominal rigidity in the mode! developed 
above19 . The mode! is then consistent with what has been termed the NKPC. Indeed, 
using equation (3.2) which relates the relation between marginal cost and macro va-
riables it can be shown that 
/\ 
met -v + Û!t - PH,t - ât 
-v + ef>flt + o-f)7 + st - (1 + ef> )ât, 
after making use of (3.3) and (3.34) . Substituting it in (3.44) this yields 
ril,ct = -v + (Œa + ef>)Yt + (Œ - Œa)Y7 - (1 + ef>)ât- (3.4 7) 
On t he other hand we can define the output gap20 as the difference between the 
domestic output and 'natural' output as 
Xt = 'Îlt - fit, (3.48) 
where natural output is computed by imposing the restriction : ril,ct = - µ for ail t in 
equation (3.47) and solving for domestic output, i. e. 
- µ =-V+ (O"a + c/>)Yt + (Œ - O"a)Y7 - (1 + ef>)ât , 
19 Tbe price st ickiness is t he only source of subopt imali ty in the equilibrium a llocation. Indeed , as 
shown by Galf and Monacelli (2004), the employment subsidy neutra lizes the market power distortion 
and by not assigning any explicit value to monetary holding balances, the monetary distortion that 
would pull monetary policy towards the Friedman rule is eli minated. 
20In our mode! we have to handle t hree def:initions of output : A measure of output, the natural 
output (which we get in an economy with no imperfect ion or nomina l rigidity) and fin a lly the output 
gap which is t he difference between the output and t he natural output. 
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which, after some algebraic manipulations, yields the natural output level as 
(3.49) 
where D =(v - µ) / (aa + </>), r = (aa - a)/(aa +</>) and finally iit = (1 + </> )/(aa + </>). 
Equation (3.49) states that the natural output for the small open economy is determined 
by world output and productivity, as well as domestic markup. In addi tion we can derive 
a relationship between real marginal cost and output gap as 
where natural output bas been substituted for its value in (3.49). By rearranging terms 
we get 
(3.50) 
Substituting (3.7) into (3.50) yields a NKPC-like equation 
(3.51 ) 
where o = lî-( a a + </> ). Notice that only the degree of openness (a) affects the small 
open economy version of the NKPC, and with a = 0, we can easily see that the Phillips 
equation is exact ly equivalent to that of the closed economy. 
The equi librium dynamics for th small open economy in terms of output gap and 
domestic infla tion can be completed by writing a version of the IS equation in terms of 
the output gap. Indeed , by combining (3.45) and (3.49) it can be shown that 
where 8 = (w - 1). If we define the natural interes t rate as 
9 8  
w h e r e  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  o p e n n e s s  a n d  t h e  e x p e c t e d  w o r l d  o u t p u t  a f f e c t  t h e  n a t u r a l  r a t e  o f  
i n t e r e s t  a n d  t h e n  t h e  n e w  I S  e q u a t i o n  w h i c h  h a s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  f o r m  
1  -
X t  =  E t { X t + i }  - - ( f t  - E t { 7 r H t + 1 }  - r r t  ) .  
( l  o .  ,  
( 3 . 5 3 )  
E q u a t i o n  ( 3 . 5 3 )  r e l a t e s  t h e  o u t p u t  g a p  i n  t h e  f o r w a r d - l o o k i n g  e q u a t i o n  t o  i n t e r e s t  r a t e ,  
d o m e s t i c  i n f l a t i o n  a n d  n a t u r a l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e .  
T o  s o l v e  t h i s  m o d e !  w e  m a k e  a  l o g l i n e a r  a p p r o x i m a t i o n  o f  i t s  e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n s  
a r o u n d  a  b a l a n c e d - t r a d e  z e r o - i n f l a t i o n  s t e a d y  s t a t e .
2 1  
T h e  m o d e l ' s  d y n a m i c  p r o p e r t i e s  
d e p e n d  i n  a  c r u c i a l  m a n n e r  o n  t h e  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c y  u s e d .  I n d e e d ,  w i t h  t h e  T a y l o r  r u l e  
w h e r e  t h e  x  p a r a m e t e r  t a k e s  t h e  v a l u e  1 ,  t h e  p e r s i s t e n t  i n f l a t i o n  r e s p o n s e  t o  a  t e c h n o l o g y  
s h o c k  i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h i s  s h o c k  w i l l  h a v e  a  p e r m a n e n t  e f f e c t  o n  p r i c e  l e v e l ,  w h i c h  w i l l  t h e n  
h a v e  a  u n i t  r o o t ,  m i r r o r e d  b y  a  u n i t  r o o t  i n  t h e  n o m i n a l  e x c h a n g e  r a t e .  I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  
a n d  f o l l o w i n g  C a l i  a n d  M o n a c e l l i  ( 2 0 0 4 )  w h e n  t a r g e t i n g  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e ,  t h e  m o n e t a r y  
a u t h o r i t y  s e e k s  t o  s t a b i l i z e  C P I  i n f l a t i o n .  S u c h  a  p o l i c y  o n l y  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  w e  s e t  
f t  - E t { n t + i }  =  < / > p ( E t n t )  +  < / > / E t ,  
f o r  a l l  t .  M o r e o v e r ,  a n d  f o l l o w i n g  W o o d f o r d  ( 1 9 9 9 )  a n d  B u l l a r d  a n d  M i t r a  ( 2 0 0 3 ) ,  o u r  
a n a l y s i s  f o c u s e s  o n  t h e  c a s e  w h e r e  < / > p  a n d  < / > y  h a v e  n o n  n e g a t i v e  v a l u e s .  T h u s ,  t h e  
n e c e s s a r y  a n d  s u f f i . c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  a  s t a b l e  a l l o c a t i o n  p a t h
2 2  
i s  g i v e n  b y  
ô ( < / > p  - 1 )  +  ( 1  - / 3 ) < / > y  #  o .  
( 3 . 5 4 )  
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  w e  a s s u m e  t h a t  t h e  f o r e i g n  c o u n t r y  p u r s u e s  a n  o p t i m a l  p o l i c y ,  i m p l y i n g  
a  c o n s t a n t  f o r e i g n  p r i c e  l e v e l  a t  e q u i l i b r i u m .
2 3  
T h e  m o d e l ' s  d y n a m i c s  c a n  b e  s t a b l e  i n  
t h i s  c a s e ,  e v e n  w i t h  n o n  s t a t i o n a r y  p r i c e s .  O t h e r w i s e , w i t h  O  ~ x  <  l  t h e  p r i c e  l e v e l  i s  
2 1
T h e  m a r k u p  i s  a l s o  a s s u m e d  t o  b e  c o n s t a n t  a t  s t e a d y  s t a t e  ( µ  =  Â )  i n  o r d e r  t o  d e r i v e  t h e  
e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n s .  
2 2  
A s  s h o w n  b y  B u l l a r d  a n d  M i t r a  ( 2 0 0 3 ) ,  t h i s  c o n d i t i o n  r u l e s  o u t  e i g e n v a l u e s  o n  t h e  u n i t  c i r c l e .  
2 3
S e e  G a l f  a n d  M o n a c e l l i  ( 2 0 0 4 )  f o r  a  d i s c u s s i o n  o n  o p t i m a l  p o l i c y  i n  t h e  f o r e i g n  c o u n t r y  a n d  S O E  
c a s e s .  
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I(O) and the condition (3.54) holds also in this case. 
In the following sections we will first set the model parameters as calibrated to 
the Canadian economy, and before analyzing the welfare implications of each regime, 
compute the impulse response functions and second moment statistics . 
3.3 Quantitative Results 
3.3.1 Mode l Calibration 
Baseline calibration of the model is based on recent litera ture and closely follows 
Galf and Monacelli (2004). The parameter values used by this study are intended to 
reflect Canadian data. 
We use a tabor suppty elasticity of about } which set ef> = 3 and a steady state 
markup µ = 1.2 meaning that the elasticity of substitution between different domestic 
goods ç is 6. The average price adjustment period by firms is set t o 4 quarters and then 
we set the sticky price parameter 'lj; to 0.75 white the degrees of opcnness of the economy 
a is set to 0.4. The discount factor {J is assumed to be equat to 0.99 and the elasticity 
of substitut ion b tween domestic and foreign goods e takes the value 1.5 according to 
Backus et al. (1995) , Galf and Monacelli (2004) use the specia l case where e = (J = l. 
T he remaining parameters are somewhat diffi cult to determine. Ind ed , there is no 
consensus among open economy researchers about the values at t ributed to the inter-
t emporal ra te of substitution (J , Cochrane (1997) uses values between one and two, 
Yun (1996) and Galf and Monacelli (2004) calibrate their models with (J = l. We fo llow 
Erceg et al. (2000) and set t his parameter to 1.5. 
The calibration fo r the policy rule parameters follows Bat ini and Yates (2003) and 
Taylor (1993). We set ef>p and ef>y to 0.5 and as discussed in Ba tini and Yates the x 
calibration is quite difficult . Indeed , u. ing a range of values within the interval [0 ,1] the 
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authors found that the optimal value of x depends on the size of inflation tax, the cost 
of indexation and the length of nominal contracts. Following this study we set x = 0.6. 
Moreover, following Galf and Monacelli (2004) and in order to calibrate the stochas-
tic properties for tabor productivity24 ( considered as a productivity shifter) and the 
stochastic properties of the exogenous variables we fit AR(l) processes to quarterly Ca-
nadian and US data25 (ROW economy) over the period 1987Q01 - 2004Q04. We obtain 
the following estimates : 
0.721194 ât-1 + éâ t, Ua = 0.0088961 
{0.09126) ' 
0.569358 â;_l + éâ• t , U a• = 0.0085895 
{0.11769) ' 
with standard errors in brackets. Finally the residual correlation is set to corr(éa,t, éa•, t) = 
0.399211. See Table 3.1 for a summary of model parameters calibration . 
3.3.2 Impulse R esponse Functions and Second Moment Analysis 
Impulse response fonctions (IRFs) play an important role in describing the impact 
that shocks have on economic variables. Figure 3.1 displays the impulse responses to a 
1% positive technology shock under HT, IT and PT regimes.26 The output gap response 
function has the same patterns for the HT and PT regimes, with an initial positive 
response of about 15% which then falls within the next two periods to reach negative 
values, and finally it reverts to steady state. The IRF under IT has the same initial 
response and then decreases to reach study state values within 5 periods. The inflation 
respon e (both domestic and CPI based inflation) displays the same patterns under the 
three policies we are targeting. 
24 Using the Canadian labor productivi ty for t he period 1963Q01 - 2002Q04 as a proxy fo r domestic 
productivity, Gali and Monacelli (2004) estimate this to be : Pa = 0.66 wit h standard deviation of 
0.0071. 
25We use t he productivity term constructed from the CANSIM series V719180 and Vl409154, and 
the US productivity using the BLS series ID PR.830006092 retrieved from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
web site. 
26 As discussed in monetary policy set ting, we set x = l to compute the impulse responses under TT 
regime and x = 0, in order to get the responses under PT regime. 
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The main difference occurs on the ini tial response to shock which is positive for 
domestic inflation (about 2%) under the IT regime and negative for th oth r two 
regimes, wi th hump-shaped responses . CPI inflation has the same patterns under the 
three r gimes, so that the monetary authority has the same response, s tabilizing inflation 
under the three regimes when the technology shock occurs. 
The nominal interest rate shows a different response. With an initial response to 
shock that is negative, it increases to attain a steady state in about 20 periods. Intuiti-
v ly, this means that aft er the economy bas been hit by a technology shock, the optimal 
monetary authority response will increase the nominal interest ra t e by a larger amount 
than the increase in infla tion, resulting in an initial increase in the real inter st ra te 
level. 
The terms of trade and net exports display similar paths, where initial positive res-
ponses and decreases reach steady state values persistently. This yields to a stationary 
behavior for those variables which defined as a property of the mode!. The nominal 
exchange rate moves in the wrong direction27 with a persistent decline being more pro-
nounced for PT and HT. The same patterns are displayed by the domestic and CPI price 
responses with a hump-shaped domestic price response under HT and PT. The unit root 
in the price level is then mirrored by the unit root in the exchange ra te. However, the 
responses of those three varia bles are quite different during HT and PT targeting, where 
after a while the path reverts to ini tial values. The initial fall in the domestic and CPI 
price responses under HT and PT are followed by hump-shaped patterns (more pro-
nounced for HT t argeting) with a fiat increase toward teady s tate values. Furthermore, 
the impact on foreign aggregat es is negligible, by construction , implying that the world 
interest rate rema ins unchanged. There is an anticipated domestic currency appreciation 
induced by the uncovered pari ty (UIP). Thus, the exchange rate depreciation explains 
the paths followed by the infla tion rates that jump up in the shock period and then 
revert back to initial levels. 
27 One can believe tha t monetary contract ion generates appreciation for the domestic currency. Thus, 
capi tal out fl ows cause demand for fo reign exchange to increase and not to fa ll , as is the case here. 
102 
The dynamic effects of foreign technology hocks are displayed in Figure 3.2. In this 
case, the foreign monetary aut hority reacts to shocks by lowering the world interest rate 
to stabilize inflation . The domestic authorities react in the same way by reducing their 
own interest rate to counterpart the real appreciation caused by the foreign policy, 28 
followed by a graduai depreciation until both interest rates converge to their steady 
state levels. 
Moreover, the output gap, domestic and CPI inflation responses display hump-
shaped patterns for both HT and PT targeting. While terms of trade is more stable 
under HT and PT t argeting, responses persistently remain above initial levels for this 
variable under IT targeting. The same patterns are displayed for net exports under the 
3 regimes. 
The fa]] in domestic and CPI prices is more accentuated with this shock under IT. 
The nominal interest rate response takes the hump-shaped form and then reverts to the 
initial value. The main difference between home and foreign technology shock responses 
is registered for the exchange rate while the response under ail regimes persistently 
remains above the initial levels. 
Finally the response functions of the macro variables to unit innovations in the 
policy shocks reveal that ail variables display the ame patterns under HT and PT tar-
geting. However, the domestic and CPI price responses for levels under IT targeting are 
also persistently above the steady state levels. Interestingly, the figure shows persistent 
exchange rate responses slightly below the ini t ial values for a il regimes. This can be 
explained by the negligible effect of the policy innovations on foreign variables. Indeed , 
a rise in nominal interest rate is followed by an instant currency appreciation and an 
anticipated depreciation since the world interest rate remains unchanged. Asset and 
goods generate such movements in exchange rate and price levels. 
In order to conclude the quantitative analysis, the second moments for some macro 
28W ith our earlier assumpt ion about the fore ign monetary policy that stabilizes price levels at equi-
librium, a reduction in world interest rate implies an appreciation of home currency. 
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variables under the three regimes are shown in Table 3.2. For each variable we report 
standard deviation. 
The second moment analysis confirms the IRF visual analyses . Indeed , the IT regime 
requires more vola tility in price levels and exchange rates than that shown under the 
other regimes. Terms of trade are more stable under HT, where their vola t ility is about 
eight times lower than that for the ITs. Intuitively, under IT price level should follow the 
I(l) process. Hence, price adjustment after the occurrence of shocks is carried out very 
sluggishly, leading to sluggish inflation behavior. In fact, lagged price levels have little 
direct influence on current price levels. In this case, the price adjustment made after 
shock occurrences inevitably entails sharp inflation fluct uation. Furthermore , the hybrid 
target can b e set taking into account both inflation and its corresponding price level, 
such that past pr ice levels affect current price levels , but their influence is not as strong 
as under IT. In this case, the price level path will lie between those under IT and PT. 
As pointed out by Kobayashi (2004), it can be said that implementing hybrid t arget ing 
can lead to relatively moderate inflation volatility by appropriately incorporating both 
the sluggish nature of inflation adjustment under IT and the rapid nature of inflation 
response under PT. More generally, and as shown in Gali and Monacelli (2004) , we find 
that across regimes the higher the terms of trade vola tility, the higher inflation and 
output gap vola tility, and therefore the higher the resulting welfare score. 
3.4 Welfare Analysis of Alternative R egimes 
The analysis of welfare implicat ions for different monetary p olicy rules has become 
an important field of study (Taylor, 1999) . The main concern is how important it is 
for policy makers to have access to a set of tools that would allow them to predict the 
effects of switching from one policy rule to another . It would t hus be worthwhile to 
investigate the welfare implications of the hybrid regime and compare them to other 
monet ary policy t arget ing schemes considered in this work. The applicat ion of the qua-
dratic approximation of the object ive function is complex and cannot be simply derived 
104 
in an open economy mode! with sticky prices. A popular measure thus uses infla tion 
and output gap volatility, in addition to the ut ili ty function. 
Furthermore, a welfare-maximizing central bank may target CPI inflation, CPI price 
or a combination of specific price and inflation paths. In fact , the key difference in ap-
proaches to inflation/ price level targeting concerns a stable, long-run price level com-
pared to maintaining a particular rate of inflation. These rule-based approaches have 
different welfare implications. Aoki (2001 ) and Devereux and Engel (2000) show that in 
a closed economy with sticky prices and backward-looking behavior , optimal policy en-
tails the per fect stabilization of the inflation rate. In fact , Svensson (1999) shows that if 
monetary authority has a price-level t argeting objective, then this may reduce inflation 
variability witbout affecting output variabili ty. This 'free-lunch' result depends on sub-
stant ial endogenous output persistence in the New- Classical Philips curve. Di ttmar and 
Gavin (2000) extend this analysis to the case where expectations are forward-looking in 
a New-Keynesian Philips curve. They show that the free-lunch argument applies without 
the need for persist ence terms. Thus, the assigning of a price level targeting objective 
by the central bank appears to improve welfare if expectations are forward-looking or if 
t here is substantial endogenous persistence. Likewise, Vestin (2000) argues in a purely 
forward-looking mode! that price level targeting will provide more effi cient outcomes 
than inflation targeting. In a closed economy mode!, Nessen and V, stin (2000) suggest 
that hybrid targeting will provide bet ter outcomes than only targeting inflation, if the 
Philips cure has forward-and backward-looking components. 
The evaluation of the household 's welfare in the small open economy can be ex-
pressed as a fr action of steady state consumption. Indeed , fo llowing Galf and Monacilli 
(2004) we d erive a second-order approximation to the domestic consumer utili ty func-
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tion in a SOE model. 29 This second order approximation ,30 expressed as a fraction of 
st eady state consumption, can be written as 
3 = - (1 - a )~ 13t[{ ir2 + (1 + </>)x2]. 
2 ~ K. H,t t 
t=O 
(3.55) 
Hence, the welfare measure for our economy can be computed by taking the un-
conditional expect ation of (3.55). The expected welfare losses of any policy in t erms of 
domestic inflation and the output gap variances are then given by 
(1 - a) ç A 
F = - 2 [~ var(1rH,t) + (1 + </>)var(xt)] . 
Using this expression we can compare different monetary policies to assess their 
welfare implications and highlight welfare cost among regimes. 
Table 3.3 shows welfare losses associated with three different regimes : HT, IT and 
PT. We assume tha t central bank wants to minimize variations in domestic inflation 
( ir H,t) . Indeed, since most of the countr ies that use inflation targeting are likely to target 
CPI inflation rather than home inflation (namely producer price inflation), HT has been 
essentially compared to the CPI inflation targeting regime (IT in the text ). Entries for 
loss functions are percentage units of steady state consumpt ion. 
There are five panels in this table. In the first panel, we report welfare losses under 
our benchmark calibration. The remaining panels display the effects of using different 
policy parameter (x) values and of lowering, respectively, the degree of economy open-
ness (a), and both the steady state mark-up (µ ) and the elasticity of labour supply 
( </>) . 
29 See Appendix 4 in Galf and Monacelli (2004) for details on t he welfare loss fun ction derivations. 
However, the derivation is restricted to the special case of log ut ili ty and uni t elasticity of substit ution 
between different goods (i.e., a = 1) = B = l ) in deriving an exact expression, otherwise, its derivation is 
more complicated . We use this approximation for comparison purpose between different regimes without 
loss of genera li ty. For more discussion about welfa.re analys is in the loglinearized mode!, refer to Kim 
and Kim (2003) and Schmit t-Grohe and Uribe (2004) . 
30 After dropping terms independent of policy and t hose of high order. 
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The results show t hat under our benchmark parametrization, the reduction in welfare 
loss results from a decrease in output and domestic inflation volatility varying from IT 
to HT regime . On the other hand , the CPI inflation targeting leads to a level of losses 
in the welfare loss function much higher than that obtained by the two other regimes. 
In fact, as usu ally found in the literature,31 welfare losses are quantitatively small for 
all regimes. 
As compared to the benchmark case, and using different policy parameter , the HT 
regime implies substantially larger welfare losses as one gets closer to extreme values 
corresponding either to IT or PT. We next consider the effect of lowering the degree of 
economy openness. This has a general effect of decreasing both domestic inflation and 
output gap volatilities leading to low welfare losses under all regimes. Intuitively, this 
means that the decrease in volatilities and the resulting welfare values are essentially 
generated by movements in small open economy variables such as terms of trade and 
exchange rate which have low effects in a 'quasi-open economy ' (with small a) . Also in 
this case, HT delivers lower welfare losses than PT and IT regimes. 
Finally, we explore the effects of lowering both the mark-up to 1.1 , which leads to 
a larger penalization of infla tion variability in the loss fonction, and the elasticity of 
labour supply to 0.1 , which implies a larger penalization of output gap volatility. This 
leads to a similar output gap volatility compared to the other scenarios considered here, 
and in turn to an amplification of the volatili ty of the domestic inflat ion whicb implies 
higher welfare losses for all three regimes. Interestingly, the HT regime leads to larger 
welfare losses than IT and PT meaning that the results may be sensitive to the mode! 
assumption as pointed out by Gali and Monacelli (2004) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 
(2001).32 
Moreover , in closed-economy models the case for price stability is quite robust. Its 
desirability is associated with t he possibility of reproducing the fluctuations that would 
31 Kollman (2002) and Smets and Wouters (2003) are recent exam ples of papers where monetary 
policy welfare implications are investigated for a sma ll open economy. 
32T he authors a rgue that the welfare ranking between different monetary policy may be sensitive to 
the distortions in the economy. 
107 
arise in a flexible-price world which produces higher welfare gain (see for instance Good-
friend and King, 2001). In the open economy models, the different dynamics of the terms 
of trade are associated with a welfare loss, relative to the monetary policy regime. In-
deed, as shown in the quantitative evaluation of the second moments conducted above, 
the terms of trade dynamics imply a substantially larger deviation on the welfare fonc-
tion as the associated volatility increases. Intuitively, this can lead to different results if 
the open economy analysis is adopted to assess welfare-maximizing monetary policy. 
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3.5 Concluding R em arks 
This chapter investigates the hybrid inflation/ price-level targeting from a New-
Keynesian perspective. To this end , we calibrate generalizat ions of the models proposed 
by Galf and Monacelli (2004) and Monacelli (2003) to the Canadian economy. Both pa-
pers develop a small open economy mode! incorporating many of the microfoundations 
appearing in a closed economy wit hin the New-Keynesian framework (see, for instance, 
Clarida, Galf, and Gertler , 2000 and Woodford , 2003) as wa recently used for the ana-
lysis of monetary policy. The model's open economy version allows for the possibility 
that international trade in goods and financial assets would affect the evolut ion of t he 
domestic economy, thus giving rise to richer dynamics within the mode!, including our 
assumption of complet e securitie market s. 
F\irthermore, in light of the considerable attention given in recent macroeconomic 
li terature to monetary policy formulations in terms of interest ra te rules, we adopt this 
formulation to construct three regimes. In addition, for the purpose of comparison to 
the hybrid regime, we analyze the IT and PT regimes . Our results show that hybrid 
targeting can lead to a successful monetary policy strategy, yet without any major 
loss in the welfare fonction. Likewise, in this kind of mode!, including more nominal 
rigidities, part icularly sticky wages or some type of indexation would be expected to 
change results obtained in a crucial manner. Further research is therefore necessary in 
order to establish the manner in which these frictions would likely alter this finding. 
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Tab. 3.1: Mode! Calibrat ion 
Parameters Values assigned 
µ 1.2 
</> 3 
ç 6 
e 1.5 
a 1.5 
a 0.4 
'!/; 0.75 
X 0.6 
<Pp 0.5 
<Py 0.5 
PA 0.72 
PA· 0.57 
a A 0.00889 
a y* 0.00859 
a r 0.50 
llO 
Tab. 3 .2: Volatili ty Under Al ternat ive Policy Regimes 
(Standard Deviat ions in %) 
HT Regime IT Regime PT Regime 
Output Gap 0.445706 0.504724 0.586738 
Domestic Infla tion 0.249263 0.279909 0.261040 
CPI Inflat ion 0.357693 0.591798 0.329794 
Nominal Interest Rate 0.290764 0.355671 0.281302 
Exchange Rate 16.51607 16.51058 16.29682 
CPI Price Level 0.549267 14.36523 0.352878 
Domestic Price Level 1.365590 23.58970 1.237270 
Terms of Trade 3.025147 23 .68741 3.035614 
Tab. 3.3: Welfare Losses Under Alternative Policy Regimes 
HT Regime IT Regime PT Regime 
Benchmark µ = 1.2, </J = 3, a= 0.4 and x = 0.6 
Var(Domestic Inflation) 0.062132 0.078349 0.068142 
Var(Output Gap) 0.198653 0.254746 0.344262 
Welfare Loss (F) -1.541324 -1.948742 -1.842111 
µ = 1.2, </J = 3, a= 0.4 and X = 0.25 
Var(Domestic Inflation) 0.073787 0.078349 0.068142 
Var(Output Gap) 0.233661 0.254746 0.344262 
Welfare Loss (F) -1.827778 -1.948742 -1.842111 
µ = 1.2 ,</J = 3,a = 0.4 and x = 0.85 
Var(Domestic Inflation) 0.082347 0.078349 0.068142 
Var(Output Gap) 0.187444 0.254746 0.344262 
Welfare Loss (F) -1.729144 -1.948742 -1.842111 
Low degree of opermess µ = 1.2, </J = 3, a = 0.25 and x = 0.6 
Var(Domestic Inflation) 0.034906 0.050817 0.042506 
Var(Output Gap) 0.082783 0.026711 0.123046 
Welfare Loss (F) -1.039187 -1.372176 -1.298804 
Low steady state mark-up and elasticity of labour supply 
µ = l.l ,</J = 10,a = 0.4 and x = 0.6 
Var(Domestic Inflation) 0.312197 0.184993 0.195961 
Var(Output Gap) 0.181364 0.095449 0.122008 
Welfare Loss (F) -7.145550 -4.194459 -4.512109 
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Fig. 3-1: Impulse Response Fu nctions to a Unit Sbock in Home Tech. Innovations 
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Fig. 3- 2: Impulse Response Funct ions to a. Unit Shock in Foreign Tech . Innovations 
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Fig. 3-3: Impulse R esponse Functions to a Unit Shock in Interest Rate Rule Innovations 
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APPENDICES 
Annexe A Model Setting 
A.1 Household's Problem 
The household maximizes 
subject to the following constraint 
and the budget constraint 
where P{ , P[ and P[* denote the prices of the risky asset , the home and foreign riskless 
bond respectively. At time t , the equity pays a dividend payout Dt and each bond pays 
one unit of the consumpt ion good a t time t+ 1 and expires. Here that "-t is expressed as 
We can introduce the first equation directly in the utility fonction. Thus the controls 
in this economy are : Ct , Bt+1 , B;+i ,At+ l · 
A.2 Firm's Problem 
The manager of t h firm maximize the value of the firm to its owners 
subject to the following constraint s 
K t+1 = (1 - ô)Kt + ( __::!___(Klt )1-ç + a2)Kt, 0 < 6 < l. 
1 - ç t 
' ' Z K 0 1- 0 It = t t n t+j , 
116 
where /Jj A~:i is the marginal rate of substitu tion of the household and nt the quantity 
of labor input . The state of technology evolves according to the AR(l) process 
Zt = exp(Zt-1) or in log: Zt = PzZt - 1 + Ezt , 
with z_1 given and Ezt is a normally distributed white noise with mean O and variance 
u~ for all t ~ O. T he controls here are :It, n t . 
A.3 Other Equations of the Model 
The dividends equa tion is given by 
The r esources cons traint equation 
To compute the resources constraint equation we can set Bt = 0 and we normalize 
At = l. The budget constraint can then be written as 
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and we know that 
At equilibrium the strict equality holds, that is the resource constraint can be written 
as 
The production function is given by 
~,,. Z K 0 1- 0 I t = t t nt+j · 
From the law of motion of capital one can isolate the term of investment 
Kt+i (1- () _1 
l t = [(-- - 1 + b - a2)--] 1-( Kt. 
Kt ai 
A.4 Log-linearization of the Model 
We define the variables without t subscripts as steady-state values and the variables 
with circumflex as a percentage deviation of the variables from their steady states. For 
example, êt = (Ct - c)/c denotes the percentage deviation of consumption from its 
steady state ( c). 
Linearizing the first-order conditions yields 
'Y1/3b E • _ 'Y1(/3b2 +1) . _ 'Y1b • • 
(1- b)(l - /3b) tCt+i - (1 - b)(l - /3b) Ct (1 - b)(l - f3b) Ct-i + At , 
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And finally, the linearization of the identities yields 
' ( J 1-ç , I 1- ç -Kt+1 = [1- 6 - a1--(K) + a2]Kt + a1(K) It 1-( 
D.Dt = Y.Yi - nW. Wt - I.Ît 
Y. Yi = C.êt + I .Ît 
The tech . shock process is linearized to 
Zt = P Zt - 1 + dé t , 
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Finally, as shown by J ermann (1994), the leisure does not enter utility function , 
so Agents will allocate their entire t ime endowment to productive work (Fixed Labor 
Economy) . In this framework n is fixed to it's steady state value (n= 0.33) . 
Annexe B Data Appendix 
D ata Sources and D efinitions of Variables 
AU macro data series are monthly and cover the period 1960M01 to 2000M12. The 
new measure of monetary shock is monthly and covers the p eriod 1969M01 to 1996M12 
(retrieved from Romer and Romer , 2004). To avoid the complications introduced by the 
seasonal adjustment methods, the data we use here are in t heir non seasonally adjusted 
forms and we include monthly seasonal dummy in our VARs. 
- The industrial production data, used as output series (Y), are from the Board of 
Governors Web site (series B50001). 
- Consumer price index, ail urban consumers are used as our price (P ), from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics Web site (series CUUROOOOSAO). 
- The three-mont h Treasury bill rate used as shor t term interest rate (R3), quoted on 
discount basis, secondary market, average of business day, from Federal Reserve Board 
(Bank of St-Louis Web site), (series tbsm3m). 
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- Ten-year U.S TI:easury bond yield used as long term interest rate (RlO) , constant 
maturity, average of business day figure, from Federal Reserve Board (Bank of St-Louis 
Web site), ( eries tcmlOy). 
- For Total reserves (TR), we use Board of Governors Monetary Base, Not Adjusted 
for Changes in Reserve Requirements, from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System (series BOGUMBNS). 
- Producer Price Index-Commodities, crude materials is used as commodity prices 
(PCM), from t he Bureau of Labor Statistics Web site (series WPUSOPlOOO). 
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Annexe C Technical Appendix 
Statistic Tests Computation 
LR Test : 
The likelihood ratio has an asymptotic x2 distribution with degrees of freedom equal 
to the number of restrictions. The formula33 used to compute the LR test is 
LR = (T- m)(log(ID,.I) - log(IDul)) ,._, x2 (n), 
with T is the number of observations, m is the number of parameters estimated (per 
equation) in the unrestricted mode], 1n1 is the natural logarithm of the residual co-
variance's determinant (computed for the restricted and unrestricted models), and n 
the number of restrictions in the VAR. The determinant of the residual covariance is 
computed as 
IDI = det(-T l I:; ÊtÊ~). 
-m t 
When the log likelihood value is computed assuming a multivariate normal (Gaus-
sian) distribution as 
T , 
l = - 2 {k(l + log21r) + log(IDI)}. 
Information Criteria : 
The two information criteria are computed as follow 
l 
SIC= -2(T) + m log(T)/T, 
where m is the number of parameters estimated using T observations. 
33This Formula employs Sims' (1980) small sample modifications which uses (T-m) rather than T 
(see Lütkepohl, 1991). 
Bibliographie 
[l] Abel , A. B . 1980. « Empirical Investment Equations : An Integrative Fra-
mework », Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Vol. 12, p. 
39-91. 
[2] - -- . 1990. « Asset Prices under Habit Formation and Catching up 
with the Joneses », American Economie Review Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 80, 
p. 38-42. 
[3] . 1991. « Asset Prices under Habit Formation and Catching up with 
the Joneses », NBER Reprints 1661 (also Working Paper 3279 ) , National Bureau 
of Economie Research, Inc. 
[4] Alla is, O. , L . C adiou et S. D ées . 2000. « Consumption Habit and Equity 
Premium in the G7 Countries », CEPII, Working Paper no 2000-19 . 
[5] An, S. , et F . Schorfheide . 2005. « Bayesian Analysis of DSGE Models », 
Manuscript, University of Pennsylvania. 
[6] B a ckus, D ., P . K. K ehoe et F. E. K y dla nd. 1995. « International Bu iness 
Cycles : Theory and Evidence », Dans : Frontiers of Business Cycle Research, 
Edited by Thomas F. Cooley, Princeton University Press. 
[7] Baglia no, F., et C. A. Favero. 1998. « Measuring Monetary Policy with VAR 
Models : an Evaluation », European Economie Review, Vol. 42, p. 1069-1112. 
[8] B a ll , L. 1999. « Policy Rules for Open Economies », Dans : John B. Taylor 
(ed.}, Monetary Policy Rules, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
[9] B arth, M. J. III, e t V . A . R a m ey. 2001. « The Cost Channel of Monetary 
Transmission », National Bureau of Economie Research (NBER) Macroeconomics 
Annual 16, p. 199-240. 
123 
[10] B a tini , N. , e t A. Ya t es. 2003. « Hybrid inflation and price level targeting », 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 35, p. 283- 300. 
[11] B enninga, S. , e t A . Protopa padakis . 1990. « Leverage Time Preference, and 
the Equity Premium Puzzle » , Journal of Monetary Economies, Vol. 25, p. 49-58. 
[12] B erg, C., et L. Jonung. 1999. « Pioneer ing Price Level Targeting : The Swedish 
Experience 1931- 1937 », Journal of Monetary Economies, Vol. 43, p. 525- 51. 
[13] B erna nke, B. S., e t A. S. Blinder. 1992. « The Federa l Funds Rate and the 
Channels of Monetary 'Iransmission », A merican Economie Review , Vol. 82, p. 
681-21. 
[14] B erna nke, B. , e t I. Mihov. 1998. « Measuring Monet ary Policy », Quarterly 
Journal of Economies, Vol. 113, p . 869-902. 
[15] B erna nke, B. S. , T. L a ubach , F. S. Mishkin e t A. S. P osen. 1999. « 
Inflation Targeting : Lessons From the International Experience », Princeton 
University Press. 
[16] Black , F. 1990. « Mean Reversion and Consumption Smoothing », Review of 
Finan cial Studies, Vol. 3, p. 107-114. 
[17] Boldr in, M. , L. J. Christia no et J. D. M . Fish er. 1995. « Asset Pricing 
Lessons for Modeling Business Cycles », National Bureau of Economie Research 
Working Paper no 5262. 
[18] . 1999. « Habit Persistence, Asset Ret urns and the Business Cycles 
», Working Paper Series WP-99-14, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. 
[19] . 2001. « Habit Persistence, Asset Returns , and the Business Cycle 
», American Economie Review , Vol. 91 , p . 149-166. 
[20] Boivin, J. 2001. « The Fed 's Conduct of Monetary Policy : Has It Changed and 
Does It Matter ? », Unpublished Paper, Columbia University. 
[21] Budrfa, S. R. 2002. « Asset Prices Under Non-Additive Habits », Ph.D. dis-
sertation, University of Alicante. 
124 
[22] Calvo, G. 1983. « Staggered Prices in a Utility Maximizing Framework » , 
Journal of Monetary Economies, Vol. 12, p. 383-398. 
[23] Campbell, J. Y. 1986. « Bond and Stock Returns in Simple Exchange Mode! 
», Quarterly Journal of Economies, Vol. 101 , p . 785-804. 
[24] - ---- . 1993. « Intertemporal Asset Pricing without Consumption Data 
», American Economie Review, Vol. 83 , p. 487-512. 
[25] . 1996. « Understanding Risk and Return » , Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 104, p. 298-345. 
[26] . 2001. « Asset Prices, Consumption , and The Business Cycle », 
Chapitre 19 dans : J . B. Taylor and M. Woodford eds. Handbook of Macroe-
conomics, North Rolland, Amsterdam, Vol. 1, p. 1231-1303 (Updated version : 
Consumption-Based Asset Pricing - Unpublished Paper). 
[27] Campbell, J. Y., et J. H. Cochrane. 1999. « By Force of Habit : A 
consumption-Based Explanation of Aggregate Stock Market Bebavior » , Jour-
nal of Political Economy, Vol. 107, p. 205-251. 
[28] Cecchetti, S. G., et J. Kim. 2003. « Inflation Targeting, Price Path Targeting 
and Output Variability », National Bureau of Economie Research Working Paper 
no 9672. 
[29] Christiano, L. J ., M. Eichenbaum et C. Evans. 1994. « Identification 
and the Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks », Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
Working Paper no 94-7. 
[30] 
[31] 
----- . 1996. « The Effects of Monetary Policy Shocks : Evidence from 
the F low of Funds », Review of Economies and Statistics,Vol. 78, p . 16-34. 
----- . 1999. « Monetary P olicy Shocks : what Have we Learnt and to 
what End » , National Bureau of Economie Research Working Paper no 6400. 
[32] Clarida, R., J. Gali et M. Gertler. 1999. « The Science of Monetary Policy 
» , Journal of Economie Literature, Vol. 37, p. 1661-1707. 
[33] 
125 
. 2000. « Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability : 
Evidence and Sorne Theory », Quarterly Journal of Economies, Vol. 115(1), p. 
147-180. 
[34] . 2002. « A Simple Framework for International Monetary Policy 
Analysis », Journal of Monetary Economies, Vol. 49, no 5, p. 879-904. 
[35] Clinton, K. 1998. « Canada-U.S. Long Term Interest Differentials in the 1990s 
», Bank Of Canada Review (Spring) , p. 17-38. 
[36] Cochrane, J. H. 1997. « Where is the Market Coing? U ncertain Facts and 
Novel Theories », National Bureau of Economie Research Working Paper no 
6207. 
[37] Cochrane, J.H., et L. P. Hansen. 1992. « Asset Pricing Lessons for Macroe-
conomics », Dans : O. J. Blanchard and S. Fisher, eds. , NBER Macroeconomics 
Annual 1992, MIT Press, Cambridge. 
[38] Constantinides, G. 1990. « Habit Formation : A R esolution of the Equity 
Premium Puzzle », Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, p. 519-543. 
[39] Corsetti , G. et P. P esenti. 2001. « Welfare and Macroeconomic Interdepen-
dence », Quarterly Journal of Economies, p. 421-445. 
[40] D anthine, J. P. , J. B. Donaldson et R. M ehra. 1992. « The Equity Pre-
mium and the Allocation of Income Risk », Journal of Economie Dynamics and 
Control, Vol. 17, p . 509-532. 
[41] D ever eux, M. , e t C . Engel. 2000. « Monetary Policy in t he Open Economy 
Revisited : Price Setting and Exchange Rate Flexibility », National Bureau of 
Economie Research Working Paper no 7665. 
[42] Dib, A. 2003. « Monetary Policy in Estima ted Models of Small Open and Closed 
Economies », Bank of Canada Working Paper no 2003-27. 
[43] Dittmar, R. , W. T. Gavin et F. E. Kydland . 1999. « Price Level Uncer-
tainty and Inflation Targeting », Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, p. 
23-33. 
126 
[44] . 2000. « What Do New-Keynesian Phillips Curves Imply for Price-
Level Targeting », Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, (March}, p. 21-30 . 
[45] Eisner, R. , e t R. H. Strotz. 1963. « Determinants of Business Investment, 
Impacts of Monetary Policy, Compiled by the Commission on Money and Credit 
», Englewood Cliff s : Prentice-H all. 
[46] Enders, W. 1995. « Applied Econometrics Time Series », New York : John 
Wiley and Sons, Inc. 
[47] Erceg, C. J., D. W. H enderson, et A . T. Levine . 2000. « Optimal Mo-
netary Policy with Staggered Wage and Price Contracts », Journal of Monetary 
Economies, Vol. 46 p. 281-313. 
[48] Fischer , S . 1994. « Modern Central Banking », Dans : The Future of Central 
Banking : The Tercentenar'I.J Symposium of the Bank of England, F. Capie, C. 
Goodhart, S. Fischer, and N. Schnadt, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 
p. 262- 308. 
[49] Fuhrer, J. C., et G. R. Moore. 1995. « Inflation persistence », Quarterly 
Journal of Economies, Vol. 111 (1) , p. 127-159. 
[50] Galf, J ., et T. Monacelli. 2004. « Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Vola-
tility in a Small Open Economy », The Review of Economie Studies, Vol. 72-3. 
[51] Goodfrie nd, M., e t R. G. King. 2001. « The Case for Price Stability, 'in First 
ECB Central Banking Conference', Why Price Stability? », National Bureau of 
Economie Research Working Paper no 8423 
[52] Gordon, D . B. , e t E . M. L eeper. 1994. « The Dynamic Impacts of Monetary 
Policy : An Exercise in Tentative Identification », Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol. 102, p. 1228-47. 
[53] H a ldane, A . G. 1995. « Targeting Inflation », London : Bank of England. 
[54] Haldane, A. G., et C. K . Salmon. 1995. « Three Issues in Inflation Targets 
», Dans : Targeting Inflation, edited by A.G. Haldane, 170- 201. London : Bank 
of England. 
127 
[55] H amilton, J. D . 1983 . « Oil and Macroeconomy since World War II » , Journal 
of Political E conomy, Vol. 91 , p. 228-248 . 
[56] - - --- . 1994 . « T ime Series Analysis », Princeton : Princeton University 
Press. 
[57] H an sen , L . P., et K . J. Sing leton. 1983. « Stochastic Consumption, Risk 
Aversion and the Temporal Behavior of Asset Returns », Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 91 , p. 249-265 . 
[58] H eaton, J. 1995. « An Empirical Investigation of Asset Pricing with Temporally 
Dependent Preference Specifications », Econometrica, Vol. 63(3), p. 681- 717. 
[59] Hoover , K. D. , e t S. J. P er ez. 1994 . « Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc Once 
More : An Evaluation of 'Does Monetary Policy Matter ?' in the Spirit of James 
Tobin », Journal of Monetary Economies, Vol. 34, p. 47-73. 
[60] Hore nt, E. 2002. « An Empirical Analysis of the Macroeconomic Effects of Go-
vernment Purchases » , Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Economies, Louisiana 
State University. 
[61] J ermann, U . J. 1994. « E conomie Fluctuations and Asset Returns » , Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Geneva. 
[62] . 1998 . « Asset Pricing in Production Economies », Journal of 
Mon etar1.J Economies, Vol. 41, p . 257-275. 
[63] K and el , S ., et R . F . Stam bau g h. 1991. « Asset Returns and Intertemporal 
Preferences » , Journal of M onetary Economies, Vol. 27, p. 39-71. 
[64) Killian , L. 2001. « Impulse Response Analysis in Vector Autoregression with 
Unknown Lag Order », Journal of Forecasting, Vol. 20, p. 161-179. 
[65] Kim , J. et S.H . Kim. 2003. « Spurious Welfare R eversais in International 
Business Cycle Models » , Journal of International Economies, Vol. 60, p. 471-
500. 
[66] King, R . G. , C. I. Plosser et S. T. R e b elo. 1988 . « Production Growth and 
Business Cycles », Journal of Monetary Economies, Vol. 21, p. 195-232. 
128 
[67] K obayashi , T. 2004 . « Hybrid Inflation-Price-Level Targeting in an Economy 
W ith Output Persistence », Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Eco-
nomie Society Vol. 51-5, p . 641-653 
[68] Kocherlakota, N. 1996. « The Equüy Premium : It's Still a Puzzle », Journal 
of Economie Literature, Vol. 34, p. 42-71. 
[69] Kollmann, R. 2002. « Monetary Policy Rules in the Open Economy : Effects 
on Welfare and Business Cycles », Journal of Monetary Economies, Vol. 49, p . 
989-1015. 
[70] K y dland , F. , et E . P rescot t . 1982. « Time to Build and Aggregate F luctua-
tions », Econometrica, Vol. 50 , p. 1345-70. 
[71] Lane, P. R. 2001. « The New Open Economy Macroeconomics : A Survey », 
Journal of International Economies, Vol. 54, p. 235-266. 
[72] Leep er, E . M . 1997. « Narrative and VAR Approaches to Monetary Policy : 
Common Identification Problems », Journal of Monetary Economies, Vol. 40, p. 
641-658. 
[73] Leeper , E. M ., C. A . Sims, e t T. Zha. 1996. « What Does Monetary Policy 
Do ? », Brookings Papers on Economie Activity no 2, p. 1-78. 
[74] Le Roy, S . F. et R. Porter . 1981. « T he P resent Value Relation : Tests on 
Variance Bounds », Econometrica, Vol. 49 , p. 555-577. 
[75] Letendre, M .A . 2003. « Capital Utilization and Ha bit Formation in a Small-
Open Economy Mode] », Canadian Journal of Economies, Vol. 37, p. 721- 741.. 
[76] Lettau , M. et H . Uhlig. 1997. « Preferences, Consumption Smoothing and 
Risk Premia », Mimeo, Tilburg University. 
[77] Litterma n s, R. B., e t L. W eiss . 1995. « Money, Real Interest Rates and 
Output : A Reinterpretation of Postwar U.S. Data », Econometrica , Vol. 53, p. 
129-56. 
[78] Long, J. B. , e t C. I. Plosser. 1983 . « Real Business Cycles », Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 91-1, p . 39-69. 
129 
[79] Lubik, T. A. et F . Schorfheide. 2003. « Do Central Banks Respond to Ex-
change Rate Movements? A Structural Investigation », Mimeo, Department of 
Economies, J ohns Hopkins Univer ity. 
[80] Lucas, R. E. , Jr. 1978. « Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy », Econome-
trica, Vol. 46, p. 1429-1445. 
[81] Lucas, R. E., Jr. , et E. C . Prescott. 1971. « Investment under Uncertainty 
», Econometrica, Vol. 39, p. 659-681. 
[82] Lütkepohl, H. 1991. « Introduction to Multiple Time Series Analysis », 
Springer- Verlag. 
[83] Mankiw, N . G . 2001. «The Inexorable And Mysterious 'Iradeoff Between In-
flation And Unemployment », Economie Journal, Vol. 111-471 , p. 45-61. 
[84] McCallum, B . T. , et E. N elson. 1998. « Nominal Income Targeting in an 
Open-Economy Optimizing Market », National Bureau of Economie Research 
Working Paper no 6675. 
[85] . 2000. « Monetary Policy for an Open Economy : An Alterna-
tive Framework with Optimizing Agents and Sticky Prices », Oxford Review of 
Economie Policy, Vol. 16, p. 74-91. 
[86] Mehra, R ., et E. C. Prescott. 1985. « The Equity Premium : A Puzzle », 
Journal of Monetary Economies, Vol. 15, p.145-161. 
[87] M endoza, E . , et M . Uribe. 2000 . « Devaluation Risk and the Business-Cycle 
Implication of Exchange Rate Management », Carnegie Rochester Conference 
Series on Public Policy, 53, p. 239-96. 
[88] Mishkin, F . S. 1997. « The Causes and Propagation of Financial Stability in 
a Global Economy », Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Review, Kansas City, 
MO , p. 55-96. 
[89] Mishkin, F. S . , et E . White . 2002. « U.S. Stock Market Crashes and their 
Aftermath : Implication for Monetary Policy », National Bureau of Economie 
Research Working Paper no 8992. 
130 
(90] Monacelli , T. 2003. « Monetary Policy in a Low Pass-Through Environment 
», ! GIER Working Papers no 228. 
(91] N essen, M. 2002. « Targeting inflat ion over t he short, medium and long term 
», Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 24, p. 313- 29. 
(92] N essen , M ., et D. Vestin. 2000. « Average inflation targeting », Sveriges 
Riksbank Working Paper Series no 119. 
[93] Nicke lsburg, G. 1985. « Small-Sample Properties of Dimensionality Statistics 
for Fitting VAR Models to Aggregate Economie Data. A Monte Carlo Study 11 , 
Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 28 , p . 183-192. 
[94] Obstfeld, M ., et K. Rogof. 1995. « Exchange Rate Dynamics Redux », Jour-
nal of Political Economy, Vol. 103, p. 624-660. 
[95] Prescott, E. C. 1986. « Theory Ahead of Business Cycle Measurement », 
Carnegie-Rochester Conference series on Public Policy, 25, p. 11-66. 
[96] Ramey, V. A. , et M . H. Sha piro. 1997. « Cost ly Capital Reallocation and 
the Effects of Government Spending » , National Bureau of Economie Research 
W orking Paper no 6283 
[97] Rame r C. D. , et D. H. Rame r. 1989. « Does Monetary Policy Matters? A 
New Test in the Spirit of Friedman and Schwartz », National Bureau of Economie 
Research Macroeconomics Annual , 4, p. 121-70. 
[98] 
[99] 
----- . 1994 . « Monetary Policy Ma tters », Journal of Monetary Econo-
mies , Vol. 4, p. 75-88. 
. 2004 . « A New Measure of Monetary Shocks : Derivation and 
Implications », Working Paper, University of Cali fornia, Berkeley. 
[100] Rouwenhorst , G . K. 1995 . « Asset Returns and Business Cycles », Dans : 
Frontiers of Business Cycle Research, Editor : Thomas F. Cooley, p. 294-330. 
[101] Saxton, J . 2003. « Monetary Policy and Asset Prices », Joint Economie Com-
mittee, United States Congress, Web : http ://www. house.gov/ jec/ . 
131 
[102] Schmitt-Grohé, S., et M. Uribe. 2001. « Stabilization Policy and the Costs 
of Dollarization », Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 33, p. 482-509. 
[103] ----- . 2003 . « Closing Small Open Economy Models », National Bureau 
of Economie Research Working Paper no 9270. 
[104] - ---- . 2004. « Optimal Operational Monetary Policy in the Christiano-
Eichenbaum-Evans Mode! of the U.S. Business Cycle », Mimeo, Duke University. 
[105] Schorfheide, F. 2000. « Loss Function-Based Evaluation of DSGE Models », 
Journal of Applied Econometrics, Vol. 15, p. 645-670. 
[106] Senh a dji , A. 1995. « Adjustment of Investment to External Shocks in a Small 
Open Economy Under Perfect and Imperfect Financial Market Structures », Mi-
meo, Washington University. 
[107] Shiller, R. J . 1981. « Do Stock Prices Move too much to be Justified by Sub-
sequent Changes in Dividends? », American Economie Review, Vol. 71 , p. 421-
436. 
[108] Sims, C . A. 1980. « Comparison of Interwar and Postwar Business Cycles 
Monetarism Reconsidered », American Economie Review, Vol. 70, p. 250-57. 
[109] ----- . 1992. « Interpreting the Macroeconomic Time Series Facts: The 
effects of Monetary Policy », European Economie Review, Vol. 36, p . 975-1000. 
[110] Sims, C . A., et T. Zha. 1996. « Does Monetary Policy Generate Recessions? 
», Working Paper, Princeton University. 
[111] Smets, F., et R. Wouters, 2003. « An Estimated Stochastic Dynamic Ge-
neral Equilibrium Mode! of the Euro Area », Journal of the European Economie 
Association, Vol. 1, p. 1123-75. 
[112] Smith, A. A. 1993. « Estimating Nonlinear Time-Series Models using Simulated 
Vector Autoregressions », Journal of Applied Econometrics, Vol. 8, p. 63-84. 
[113] Strongin, S. 1995. « The Identification of Monetary Policy Disturbances : Ex-
plaining the Liquidity Puzzle», Journal of Monetary Economies, Vol. 35, p. 463-
97. 
132 
[114] Sundaresan, S. M. 1989. « Intertemporally Dependent Preferences and the 
Volatility of Consumpt ion and Wealth », Review of Finaneial Studies, Vol. 2, p. 
73-89. 
[115] Svensson, L. E. O. 1995. « Optimal Inflation Targets, 'Conservative ' Cen-
tral Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts », CEPR Discussion Papers no 1249, 
C.E. P.R. Papers. 
[116] ----- . 1998. «Inflation Targeting as a Monetary Policy Rule», National 
Bureau of Economie Research Working Paper no 6790. 
[117] . 1999. « Price-Level Targeting versus Inflation Targeting : A Free 
Lunch? », Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 31-3 Part 1, p. 277-95. 
[118] . 2000. « The Zero Bound in an Open Economy : A Foolproof 
Way of Escaping from a Liquidity Trap », National Bureau of Economie Research 
Working Paper no 7957. 
[119] Taylor, J . B. 1993. « Macroeconomic Policy in a World Economy », New York: 
W. W. Norton. 
[120] . 1996. « Policy Rules as a Means to a More Effective Monetary 
Policy », Bank of Japan Monetary and Economie Studies, Vol. 14 (1), p. 28-39. 
(121] . 1999. « A Historical Analysis of Monetary Policy Rules », Dans: 
J.B. Taylor ed., Monetary Policy Rules, Chicago : U. of Chicago Press. 
[122] Vestin, D. 2000. « Price level targeting versus inflation t argeting in a forward 
looking mode] », Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series no 106. 
[123] Weil , P. 1989. « The Equity Premium Puzzle and the Risk-Free Rate Puzzle », 
Journal of Monetary Economies, Vol. 24, p. 401-421. 
[124] Weise, C. L. 1996. « Severity of Economie Fluctuations Under a Balanced 
Budget Amendment », Contemporary Economie Policy, Vol. 14, p. 26- 40 . 
[125] Woodford, M. 2000. « Pitfalls of Forward-Looking Monetary Policy », Ame-
rican Economie Review, Vol. 90-2- , p. 100-104. 
133 
[126] - - --- . 2003 . « Interest and Prices : Foundations of a Theory of Monetary 
Policy » , Princeton University Press. 
[127] Yun, T . 1996. « Monetary Po!icy, Nominal Price Rigidity, and Business Cycles », 
Journal of Monetary Economies, Vol. 37, p . 345-70 . 
